GRIFFIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/25/2015 1:38 AM

SILENCE, CONFESSIONS, AND THE NEW
ACCURACY IMPERATIVE
LISA KERN GRIFFIN†
ABSTRACT
Silence is both overpriced and underrated. This Article assesses the
status of silence in light of renewed attention to reliability in criminal
procedure. First, it considers the meaning of silence, both outside of
the criminal justice process and within it. The Article then describes
how silence can safeguard the context of confessions by making space
for suspects to choose or reject engagement while shielding the content
of statements from government manipulation. This account seeks to
advance the discussion about protecting silence beyond the debate as
to whether it advantages the innocent or the guilty. Empirical
developments concerning wrongful convictions establish that factually
innocent defendants do make false confessions, that the government
often co-authors those statements, and that errors occur because the
cost to defendants of staying silent is too high. The Article concludes
by evaluating both exclusionary rules and law enforcement regulation
that could better protect silence and, in doing so, enhance accuracy.
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INTRODUCTION
The “right to silence” figures prominently in both criminal
procedure and popular culture about the criminal justice system, but
1
neither silence itself nor any such right actually exists. This Article
explores the content of attempted silence, its function in
interrogations, and the emerging connection between making space
for silence and improving accuracy. It argues that the failure to
understand and defend silence allows law enforcement to insert
material into suspects’ statements and, in doing so, to introduce error
into criminal adjudication.
Many representations of silence outside of the criminal justice
process illuminate two important aspects of the failure to protect it in
interrogations. Silence is both unattainable and interactive. Its
complexities begin to emerge from consideration of the silent
2
symphonies and blank canvases of postmodern art, which expose
silence as so dynamic that it can never be perfected. There is always
substance to silence, including information and engagement for the
listener confronted with it. As performances of silence in the arts
demonstrate, the audience adds content to silence both deliberately
and inadvertently, and can later mistake those contributions for
original statements by the performer.
Legal rules have not accounted for either the distinction between
silence and emptiness or the inaccuracies that can flow from the
moment that silence is breached. As the privilege against selfincrimination continues to contract, its diminished protections can be
traced in part to misperceptions about what silence communicates,
1. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2182–83 (2013) (stating that “misconceptions
notwithstanding, the Fifth Amendment . . . does not establish an unqualified ‘right to remain
silent’”).
2. See John Cage, 4’33” (1952).

GRIFFIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

11/25/2015 1:38 AM

SILENCE

699

and about the response that it can provoke from law enforcement.
Silence currently counts, for example, as an affirmative admission of
guilt if a suspect remains silent instead of proffering anticipated
3
denials. Moreover, although a suspect cannot achieve a romantic
4
conception of pure silence, when stillness fails, the broken silence
5
itself constitutes waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Police leverage this perceived acquiescence while disregarding the
6
signaled desire to separate from interrogators.
Overriding attempted silence can lead, however, to jeopardizing
reliability. Suspects rarely succeed in imposing silence on
interrogators engaged in aggressive questioning, and prolonged
questioning is a strategy that can turn a suspect’s noncompliance into
a false confession. When law enforcement breaches silence at critical
junctures in interrogations, co-authored confessions—containing
known and anticipated elements that investigators themselves
generate—often result. And statements with substantial content
provided by the government can indicate both involuntariness and
7
inaccuracy.
Recent data attributing wrongful convictions to false confessions
sheds new light on the way in which silence itself can protect
8
innocence. Growing evidence from DNA exonerations has
established that the problem of wrongful convictions is substantial,
and that a significant number of those errors can be traced to
9
government participation in the production of a suspect’s statement.
The new empirical moment in criminal procedure scholarship thus
creates an opportunity to revisit the rules surrounding silence and the
way in which they connect to reliability. With the occurrence of error

3. Salinas, 133 S. Ct at 2182.
4. See, e.g., HENRY DAVID THOREAU, A WEEK ON THE CONCORD AND MERRIMACK
RIVERS 392 (Carl F. Hovde, William L. Howarth & Elizabeth Hall Witherell eds., 1980)
(describing silence as the “universal refuge”).
5. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388–89 (2010).
6. The facts of Thompkins, id. at 374–77, illustrate this approach.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(recognizing that a defendant’s willingness to adopt responses suggested by the government
constitutes evidence of involuntariness).
8. See Brandon L. Garrett, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 395, 396
(2015) (stating that many recent cases of DNA-based exonerations have been “dominated by
false confessions”).
9. See id. (explaining that “recently exposed false confessions were seemingly detailed—
containing information that police had said only the true culprits could have known”).

GRIFFIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

700

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/25/2015 1:38 AM

[Vol. 65:697

in criminal adjudication no longer a theoretical issue, the real gains
and low costs of making more space for silence are easier to calculate.
This closer look at what silence consists of, how it communicates,
and what occurs when it is breached suggests a reconceptualization of
the measures that protect it. Part I of the Article describes artistic
representations of silence to begin to give it some content and make it
possible to “listen” to the signals that silence sends. It then assesses
the legal meaning of silence in investigations in light of this broader
cultural context. In Part II, the Article links silence and accuracy in
order to move the debate about the scope of the right to remain silent
beyond speculation on whether it benefits innocent or guilty
defendants. Empirical developments on false confessions establish
that there are “known innocents” who attempted silence, and their
cases raise the possibility that a more robust right to silence could
decrease wrongful convictions. Part III addresses potential reforms to
both legal standards and law enforcement methods that would raise
the status of silence in investigations and better protect against error.
I. ATTEMPTED SILENCE
A. No Such Thing as Silence
Silence is not simple. Reevaluating its constitutional status first
requires a fuller theory of what it means. Reflections on silence in
other contexts help illuminate its distinction from blankness, its
communicative function, and the way in which failed attempts at
silence conflate speaker and listener.
Performers and visual artists have long explored the impossibility
of pure silence. Consider, for example, composer John Cage’s work
4’33”. When it was first presented in 1952, it consisted of a virtuoso
pianist, David Tudor, sitting at the piano for four minutes and thirty10
three seconds without striking a note. Commonly known as the
11
“silent” piece, Cage’s composition includes three movements. Tudor
raised and lowered the piano lid at the beginning and end of each
movement, measured the passing time with a stopwatch, and turned

10. See JOHN CAGE, 4’33” 1960 TYPED “TACET” VERSION (1960), reprinted in 4’33”: JOHN
CAGE CENTENNIAL EDITION 2 (2012).
11. Alex Ross, Searching for Silence: John Cage’s Art of Noise, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 4,
2010, at 52, 52.
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several pages of the score during the performance. Each time the
piece is presented, the performer or performers—the score is written
for a single instrument, an ensemble, or an orchestra—receive
13
instructions to produce no intentional sounds at all. But of course,
though the orchestra appears silent, members of the audience are not.
The inevitable murmurs and rustles from the listeners, as well as
14
incidental sounds in the concert hall, form part of the composition.
In Cage’s words, the project sought to demonstrate that there is “no
15
such thing as silence.”
There is no such thing as silence because the performer cannot
maintain it, and the audience cannot avoid filling it. Governmentcreated evidence in criminal cases similarly arises both from
supplementing suspects’ own words and from imputing facts to
suspects that do not originate with them. Documented false
confessions suggest that when the government presses past attempted
silence, it has not so much overcome it as replaced it with evidence of
16
the government’s own making. Preventing that inaccuracy begins
with understanding what silence is and does, and work like Cage’s
aids comprehension. The primary substance of any performance of
4’33” comes from the audience’s search for patterns in the
background noise and from the experience of adding its own ambient
sounds. Cage demonstrated how intentional and unintentional sound
merge in a composition and can change a work each time it is
performed.
12. See Andrew Kania, Silent Music, 68 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 343, 344 (2010)
(detailing a reconstruction of the piano score used at the premiere, which consists of “trebleand bass-clef staves that contain no notes or rests,” bar lines, and graphic measurement of time).
13. Cage also provided that 4’33” could be “performed by any instrumentalist or
combination of instrumentalists and last any length of time.” CAGE, supra note 10; see also
WILLIAM FETTERMAN, JOHN CAGE’S THEATRE PIECES: NOTATIONS AND PERFORMANCES 79–
80 (1996) (noting that, whatever the length, the piece is still called 4’33”).
14. For extended discussions of 4’33”, see generally KYLE GANN, NO SUCH THING AS
SILENCE: JOHN CAGE’S 4’33” (2010), and LYDIA GOEHR, THE IMAGINARY MUSEUM OF
MUSICAL WORKS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC (2007).
15. Ross, supra note 11, at 52. According to Cage, the earliest inspiration for the piece was
his experience in an anechoic chamber, where he determined that silence was more than the
absence of sound. John Cage, Autobiographical Statement (1990), http://www.johncage.org/auto
biographical_statement.html [http://perma.cc/2554-DN97].
16. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321 (2009) (“[T]here is mounting empirical
evidence that [interrogation tactics] can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to
confess to crimes they never committed.”); BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 18 (2011) (“In a coerced-compliant
confession, the pressure police apply during the interrogation may not be illegal, and it may
come from tactics that judges have approved.”).
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Recent revivals of Yves Klein’s more elaborate MonotoneSilence Symphony again underscore the co-authorship of listener and
17
performer. Swiss composer Roland Dahinden recently conducted
the piece with seventy performers—cellists, violinists, bassists, flutists,
oboists, French horn players, and singers—all filling the air for twenty
minutes with a single note played without vibrato or variation,
followed by twenty minutes of silence. In the silence, Dahinden
explains, “[y]ou sit in the audience and you start to hear some
melodies and some fragments of melodies, and yet nobody is playing
18
them.”
Silent music is but one example of the impossibility of creating
and preserving silence, and other media similarly experiment with the
way silence can shift attention from the performer to the
surroundings and the audience. 4’33” reversed the conventional
direction of music, and was both highly controversial and hugely
19
influential. Postmodern visual art owes a particular debt to the silent
symphony, and its reconstructed score was the centerpiece of a recent
20
exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art. The exhibit, entitled There
Will Never Be Silence, explores chance operations like ambient and
involuntary noises in music, and the indeterminacy of monochrome

17. YVES KLEIN, Monotone-Silence Symphony (1949).
18. Randy Kennedy, A Sound, Then Silence (Try Not to Breathe): Yves Klein’s ‘MonotoneSilence’ Symphony Comes to Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at C1; see also id. (“‘You
get into the deepness of a silence and you realize that silence is not a nothing,’ [Daniel Moquay,
director of the Klein archive and estate] said.”).
19. Ross, supra note 11, at 53 (noting that “Cage’s radicalism was lifelong and unrelenting”
and that “he took the path of most resistance”). 4’33”, as Kyle Gann describes, was viewed by
many as a step too far and affected Cage’s reputation as a “serious composer.” GANN, supra
note 14, at 121. More recently, 4’33” has even inspired digital silence. The entire piece was
“broadcast” on BBC radio in 2004, and various silent tracks are now available for download on
iTunes. Cage’s publishers also engaged in a playful copyright dispute with British composer
Mike Batt, who included “A One Minute Silence” as a blank track on the album “Classical
Graffiti” by the rock band The Planets. See Mike Batt, Postman Batt Breaks Silence on Silence,
MADHOUSE RAG (Dec. 11, 2010), http://madhouserag.com/postmanbatt/postman-batt-breakssilence-on-silence [http://perma.cc/JG2J-9FMW]. Batt issued a statement claiming that his
silence was superior because it “said in one minute” what it took Cage four minutes and thirtythree seconds to say. See Composer Pays for Piece of Silence, CNN (Sept. 23, 2002, 12:21 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/SHOWBIZ/Music/09/23/uk.silence [http://perma.cc/LWF8-ZNDX].
20. See Corinna da Fonseca-Wollheim, Visual Portents of a Silent Bolt of Thunder:
MoMA’s ‘There Will Never Be Silence,’ About John Cage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2014, at C1
(describing the exhibit). Visual artists including Marcel Duchamp, Kurt Schwitters, Robert
Morris, Lawrence Weiner, Yoko Ono, and Andy Warhol reference Cage’s work. Id. As Walter
De Maria, a sculptor who completed a stainless-steel work entitled Cage II wrote, “I never did
like his music actually. But the ideas were always well stated.” Id.
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canvases and found objects as well. Cage himself was influenced by
Marcel Duchamp’s “ready-made” art and his inversion of content and
22
context as well as the smooth, unarticulated white canvases of
23
another frequent collaborator, Robert Rauschenberg. Rauschenberg
stripped out the anticipated elements of “art” to show the interaction
between the “silent” paintings and “the light and dust particles in the
24
air.”
Filmmakers have further investigated the texture of silence and
complicated its meaning. A 1964 film by Nam June Paik—Zen for
Film—consists of a projection of a roll of clear film, punctuated by
25
the sound of the projector and the dust on the film itself. Samuel
Beckett wrote and directed Film, which runs twenty-four minutes
26
without dialogue or background music. Modernist writers from
Virginia Woolf to Harold Pinter also exposed the inevitable
expressive functions of silence between people and within
27
conversations. Performance artists have not only given silence
concrete form but also commodified it. For Yves Klein’s 1958
exhibition Le Vide (The Void), he purged a small Parisian gallery of
28
every object within it, scrubbed it clean, and painted it pure white.
He declared the “invisible pictorial state” to be “endowed with
autonomous life” and proceeded to sell several copies of a work he

21. Id.
22. See DAVID TOOP, SINISTER RESONANCE: THE MEDIUMSHIP OF THE LISTENER 69
(2010) (quoting a fragment attributed to Marcel Duchamp stating that “[o]ne can look at seeing;
one can’t hear hearing”).
23. Robert Rauschenberg, White Paintings (1951).
24. See da Fonseca-Wollheim, supra note 20; see also JOHN CAGE, SILENCE: LECTURES
AND WRITINGS 102 (1961) (describing the paintings, which appear to be blank, white canvases,
as “reflective surfaces changing what is seen by means of what is happening” and “airports for
the lights, shadows, and particles”).
25. Nam June Paik, Zen for Film (1964).
26. Samuel Beckett, Film (1965). Beckett intended the film to demonstrate that the act of
“being” necessarily includes “being perceived.” See id. On the impossibility of silence, see also
AD REINHARDT, Twelve Rules for a New Academy, in ART-AS-ART: THE SELECTED WRITINGS
OF AD REINHARDT 104 (Barbara Rose ed., 1975) (“No such thing as emptiness / or invisibility,
silence . . . .”).
27. See, e.g., SAMUEL BECKETT, THE UNNAMABLE (1953); HAROLD PINTER, SILENCE
(1969); see also BERNARD P. DAUENHAUER, SILENCE: THE PHENOMENON AND ITS
ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE 4–5 (1980) (describing, in the context of Pinter plays, negative
silence that punctuates speech and positive silence that states and shifts themes); TOOP, supra
note 22, at 200 (discussing silence in the work of William Faulkner and Virginia Woolf).
28. Rebecca Solnit, Yves Klein and the Blue of Distance, 26 NEW ENG. REV., no. 2, 2005, at
176, 178.
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called the Zone of Immaterial Pictorial Sensibility. Though patrons
paid (in gold) for their copy of the piece, they received nothing
30
tangible in exchange.
Theorizing the content and function of silence itself gives rise to
new thinking about suspects and defendants who try but fail to
remain silent. If there is no such thing as silence, then a privilege
extended only to those who remain perfectly silent is a hollow one.
Moreover, the performances of silence in other realms, as
demonstrated by the work of John Cage and his contemporaries,
reveal that it is never inert, and that when silence attempts but does
not achieve separation, then the listener inevitably begins to construct
meaning. That constructed meaning links the low status of attempted
silence with the danger of unreliable statements. Law enforcement’s
interaction with silence is a key source of inaccuracy and wrongful
convictions. Cage’s work elucidates why that occurs. As he explained,
31
“[T]ry as we may to make a silence, we cannot.” A more ample
theory of silence also illuminates how deceptive the sounds around it
can be, and thus how overriding attempted silence can enlarge the
problem of government-created evidence.
B. Silence and Separation
Although the connection between silence and autonomy has long
been recognized, understanding that it is impossible to sustain pure
silence, and that much is lost when the attempt goes unrecognized,
puts a new gloss on the significance of silence. Silence indicates the
32
need for a space within which to make choices. It protects “freedom
33
to choose what to say to whom and when to say it,” and it leaves
34
room for individuals to form their own plans. Silence preserves an

29. Id. at 178–79.
30. Id.
31. CAGE, supra note 24, at 8.
32. See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, SILENCE AND FREEDOM 24 (2007) (stating that it
is ultimately “deep and terrifying silence that constitutes our declaration of independence from
the will of others”).
33. Austin Sarat, Introduction: Situating Speech and Silence, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN
AMERICAN LAW 1, 3 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010). But see PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING
CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 82 (2000) (calling into question the
existence of a “choosing subject” in the context of a police interrogation).
34. See SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 3 (stating that “silence protects the freedom to choose
between public obligation and private commitment”); cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing the “right to be let alone” as “the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men”).
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interior realm, mental privacy, and introspection. Allowing silence to
separate thus gives effect to the autonomy rationales that partly
animate the Fifth Amendment privilege. The Supreme Court has
stated that an individual should have the right “to remain silent unless
35
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.”
36
Indeed, the majority opinion in Miranda v. Arizona references the
37
concept of free choice nine times.
Attempted silence signifies this desire to create a boundary; it is
a statement at least about the choice to remain separate. Silence per
se may not exist, but the effort to maintain it creates a border
38
between the self and interrogators. That same border often
separates accurate and inaccurate statements and thus merits stronger
protection. The autonomy and reliability principles behind Fifth
Amendment protections converge in the space that silence creates
between a suspect’s own words and confessions co-authored by the
government.
Yet common interrogation tactics and narrowing constitutional
constructions of the right to claim silence both operate to close that
gap. Questioners crowd the suspect’s space and override the appeal
for separation. The interrogation room itself imposes physical limits:
It is small and enclosed, and one can sit there for an extended period
39
of time. As the Supreme Court described in Miranda, the
environment of a typical interrogation is “compelling,” “secret,”
40
“isolated,” “menacing,” and “police-dominated.” A longstanding
approach to breaking silence is to establish a sense that questioner

35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8
(1964)).
36. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
37. Id. at 457–58, 465, 474; see also William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV.
975, 976 (2001) (“Miranda left it for suspects to decide, by either agreeing to talk or by calling a
halt to questioning and/or calling for the help of a lawyer, whether the police were behaving too
coercively.”).
38. See, e.g., SUSAN SONTAG, The Aesthetics of Silence, in A SUSAN SONTAG READER 181,
187–88 (1983) (“One recognizes the imperative of silence, but goes on speaking anyway.
Discovering that one has nothing to say, one seeks a way to say that.”).
39. See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
134 (2012) [hereinafter SIMON, IN DOUBT] (“Interrogations are conducted in specially designed
rooms that are small, windowless, and secluded.”); DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE
KILLING STREETS 210 (1991) [hereinafter SIMON, HOMICIDE] (describing the interrogation
room as “four yellow cinderblock walls, a dirty tin ashtray on a plain table, a small mirrored
window and a series of stained acoustic tiles on the ceiling”).
40. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 457, 461 & 470.
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41

and suspect are alone together. The “quiet room” is a related
42
paradigm in interrogation techniques, designed to convey intimacy.
In writer David Simon’s iconic descriptive work on the Baltimore
Homicide Department’s tactics, he reports that this illusion of privacy
distorts “the natural hostility between hunter and hunted,
transforming it until it resembles a relationship more symbiotic than
43
adversarial.” Conflating the speakers in a distorted exchange often
yields unreliable evidence.
This occurs in part because, given interrogators’ expectations and
experiences, sustained silence can surprise them. In a culture where
44
data increases exponentially, interrupting the anticipated flow of
45
information requires careful, affirmative steps. That resistance is a
46
procedural move, however—an insistence on differentiating oneself.
It “expresses concern—shared and presented by law itself—that the
legal process may not be able to do justice to, or in terms of, the

41. See FRED E. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 71 (1942)
(“The principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy.”).
42. BROOKS, supra note 33, at 41.
43. SIMON, HOMICIDE, supra note 39, at 206.
44. To “live in Modern America,” as Michael Seidman notes, “is to be surrounded by
noise.” SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 205; cf. SUSAN CAIN, QUIET: THE POWER OF INTROVERTS
IN A WORLD THAT CAN’T STOP TALKING 4 (2012) (“Introversion—along with its cousins
sensitivity, seriousness, and shyness—is now a second-class personality trait, somewhere
between a disappointment and a pathology. . . . Extroversion is an enormously appealing
personality style, but we’ve turned it into an oppressive standard to which most of us feel we
must conform.”).
45. Steven I. Friedland, Post-Miranda Silence in the Wired Era: Reconstructing Real Time
Silence in the Face of Police Questioning, 80 MISS. L.J. 1339, 1344 (2011) (suggesting that, given
the rapid increase in communication in the digital era, when “individualized, directed questions
go unanswered” the suspect is intentionally avoiding participation).
46. See Mike Redmayne, Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 209, 209 (2007) (“[T]he most compelling rationale for the privilege is that it
serves as a distancing mechanism, allowing defendants to disassociate themselves from
prosecutions.”); see also Dennis Kurzon, When Silence May Mean Power, 18 J. PRAGMATICS 92,
93–94 (1992) (“[A]t times it is the silent person who uses his or her silence to gain control of the
situation—to attain power.”). An intriguing example of silence as resistance comes from the
Dutch dramatic film A Question of Silence. The three defendants portrayed—women who have
in various ways felt unheard and unseen throughout their lives—are heard for the first time
when they silently defy the psychiatrist assessing their sanity. She declares them sane despite the
bizarre and brutal murder they had committed because she listens to the effortful, silent protest
underlying their failure to cooperate with the examination. A QUESTION OF SILENCE (Sigma
Film Productions, 1982); see also I’VE LOVED YOU SO LONG (UGC YM, 2008) (depicting a
woman convicted of a serious crime who maintains silence throughout the investigation, the
trial, and her years in prison).
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accused’s own speech.” Michael Seidman also highlights the
connection between silence and the authenticity and integrity of
narrative. “Whereas speech ensnares us in a web of other people,” he
writes, “silence demonstrates the ineradicable and exhilarating
48
loneliness of pure choice.” The discernible content of silence lies
primarily in this refusal to take part. Although difficult to maintain
over time, silence should have more procedural force when it is
attempted. The current law of interrogations, however, gives
attempted silence no effect.
Nor has legal theory accounted for the complicated co49
authorship of statements produced in the wake of attempted silence.
Silence in performance illustrates why preserving that space matters.
It otherwise fills with sound from the audience. What creates
interesting compositions in the arts leaves dangerous ambiguity in the
criminal justice system. When law enforcement attributes substantive
50
meaning to silence, that imputed meaning often misleads. Negative
inferences flow from opting out of questioning, even though greeting
law enforcement with silence or signs of anxiety may have nothing to
do with consciousness of guilt. And when interrogators then add their
own sounds to the silence and thus shape a statement to conform to
expectations, even deeper inaccuracies can result.

47. Marianne Constable, Our Word is Our Bond, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN
LAW, supra note 33, at 18, 36; see also MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES 150 (2005)
(“The silence of an accused following a felicitous warning . . . must be taken as accepting the
law’s acknowledgment that conditions during in-custody interrogation may not be conducive to
speech.”). Kent Greenawalt also explored the obligations of the accused in his classic defense of
the right to silence. R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 15, 34–43 (1981).
48. SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 16; see also ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955) (“[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great
landmarks in man’s struggle to make himself civilized.”).
49. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 403 (quoting defendant Ted Bradford, who falsely
confessed and later stated that he got the details “from the detectives” and “did not supply any
information at all”) (citation omitted)).
50. For an intriguing example of silence misconstrued as assent outside the law
enforcement context, see Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward’s account of their effort to get a
confirmation of White House aide H. R. Haldeman’s role in Watergate. Bernstein called a
Justice Department lawyer, asked about Haldeman’s role, and told him that they would run the
story unless the lawyer hung up before Bernstein finished counting to ten. The lawyer stayed on
the line, but apparently because he misunderstood; his silence was taken as a confirmation
although his intention was to warn them against running the story. See CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB
WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 178–94 (1974).
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C. The Legal Meaning of Silence
In contemporary criminal investigations, however, silence rarely
succeeds in separating defendants’ own thoughts and plans from
investigators’ intentions. Conversely, silence is often taken as
incriminating speech. Law enforcement can accuse someone of a
crime and then introduce silence in the face of that accusation as
51
substantive evidence of guilt. Silence can also impeach a defendant’s
52
excuse, explanation, or alibi at trial. Relatedly, silence in response to
a statement by someone else can qualify as a defendant’s adoption of
that statement for purposes of the exemption of a party’s own
53
admissions from the hearsay prohibition. It is treated as evidence of
the truth of the unrefuted accusation and admissible as such, so long
as “it would have been natural, under the circumstances, to assert [or
54
deny] the fact.” But the circumstances of both law enforcement
encounters and criminal accusations upset the balance of natural
55
conversation. Withdrawal when confronted with law enforcement
questioning constitutes the most ordinary reaction. Choosing to stay
silent, however, does not suffice to invoke a defendant’s right to have
56
silence and end questioning. Thus, while silence has evidentiary
57
worth, it cannot by itself assert a defendant’s rights.

51. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013); see also United States v. Frazier, 408
F.3d 1102, 1110–11 (8th Cir. 2005) (permitting an inference of guilt from pre-Miranda silence).
52. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (impeachment with pre-custody
silence “follows the defendant’s own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the
truthfinding function of the criminal trial”); United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.
1985) (testimony that defendants “made no effort to explain their presence at [a location
connected to drug smuggling] on the night of their arrest” was properly admitted because their
silence came before any Miranda warnings); cf. United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023,
1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The non-reaction the government seeks to introduce as ‘demeanor’
evidence is not an action or a physical response, but a failure to speak.”).
53. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (“A statement . . . is not hearsay [if] . . . [t]he statement
is offered against an opposing party and[] is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed
to be true . . . .”); cf. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (“Statements against interest are regularly
admitted into evidence at criminal trials, and there is no good reason to approach a defendant’s
silence any differently.” (citation omitted)).
54. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 249 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B)
advisory committee’s note (“When silence is relied upon, the theory is that the person would,
under the circumstances, protest the statement made in his presence, if untrue.”).
55. See generally Deborah Tannen, Silence: Anything But, in PERSPECTIVES ON SILENCE 93
(Deborah Tannen & Muriel Saville-Troike eds., 1985) (explaining the role and meaning of
silence in conversation).
56. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 383–84 (2010).
57. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 (“A suspect who stands mute has not done enough to put
police on notice that he is relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege.”).
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This is so because, contrary to the popular gloss on “taking the
Fifth,” no robust right to be silent or to impose silence on law
enforcement actually exists. The Fifth Amendment provides
58
protection only against compelled, testimonial self-incrimination.
Disregard for the procedural significance of silent refusal has a long
provenance. According to Albert Alschuler, for example, the Fifth
Amendment privilege “in its inception was not intended to afford
criminal defendants a right to refuse to respond to incriminating
59
questions.”
Instead, “as embodied in the United States
Constitution,” its goal was simply to prohibit “improper methods of
60
interrogation.” One must affirmatively assert the right to stay silent,
while under threat of judicially imposed punishment, before the right
even attaches.
Until the 1966 Miranda decision, the “improper” questioning
addressed by the Fifth Amendment did not generally contemplate
61
extrajudicial interrogations like encounters with the police. The
Court’s earlier oversight of police questioning references the Due
62
Process Clause, using a “totality of the circumstances” inquiry to
evaluate whether a given interrogation technique overbore a suspect’s
63
will. The nature of law enforcement’s threats and promises, the
conditions of the questioning, and the suspect’s particular
64
vulnerabilities are among the relevant circumstances.
That
65
subjective test has proven unpredictable, and the Miranda Court

58. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “no person shall . . . be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself”).
59. Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2638 (1995).
60. Id. at 2631.
61. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460–61 (1966). But cf. Bram v. United States, 168
U.S. 532, 563–65 (1897) (applying the privilege against self-incrimination to exclude an
involuntary extrajudicial confession).
62. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959).
63. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (“In determining whether a
defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of the
surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.”); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
64. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 281–84.
65. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 568–637 (1961) (including an exegesis on the
meaning of voluntariness (complete with 97 footnotes) that garnered only two votes); see also,
e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869–70 (1981)
(stating that the pre-Miranda test was a “subtle mixture of factual and legal elements” that
“virtually invited” judges to “give weight to their subjective preferences”).
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substituted a set of bright-line requirements in the form of warnings
66
to suspects.
The Miranda decision concluded that the privilege against selfincrimination is “fully applicable during a period of custodial
interrogation” and required specific safeguards for the privilege in
67
that setting. But those safeguards are not additional protections so
much as a hedge against the implications of the holding. Miranda
established that all situations of custodial interrogation are, by
68
definition, compulsion, and the constitutional privilege is violated
whenever there is compelled testimonial self-incrimination. As a
result, all incriminating statements obtained through custodial
interrogations were theoretically subject to exclusion. In other words,
Miranda stands for a proposition it does not state. It does not grant a
“right to remain silent” per se. Rather, it sets forth a procedure for
permitting custodial interrogation despite the right to be free from
69
compelled testimonial self-incrimination.
The Court’s establishment of the well-known warnings that
suspects receive—and its pronouncement that those warnings would
be sufficient to mitigate the inherent compulsion of interrogations—
70
allowed the continued use of investigative interviews. A person in
custody and subject to questioning “must first be informed in clear
71
and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.” That
warning must also “be accompanied by the explanation that anything
72
said can and will be used against the individual in court.” And the
suspect must be further “informed that he has the right to consult

66. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492; see Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 628 (1996) (noting that the Miranda rule was intended to
displace “the subjective, case-by-case due process voluntariness approach with an objective
standard that applied equally to all cases”).
67. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
68. See id. at 444, 457–58; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 435, 447 (1987) (interpreting Miranda to hold that even “the briefest period of
interrogation necessarily will involve compulsion”).
69. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 561 (1996) (“[T]he Warren Court . . .
explicitly structured Miranda’s warning and waiver requirements to ensure that confessions
could continue to be elicited and used.”).
70. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599, 1616 n.47
(2009) (“[O]nce suspects have received and waived their Fifth Amendment rights, courts give
interrogators a lot of leeway on the theory that the warnings educate and fortify suspects for the
interrogation ordeal.”).
71. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68.
72. Id. at 469.
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with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation,”
and that “if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent
73
him.” Given those warnings, a suspect, in theory, no longer
experiences compulsion, and subsequent statements are admissible.
Many police interrogations, however, occur prior to formal custody
74
and therefore in the absence of any warnings at all.
Moreover, even though the Fifth Amendment privilege now
extends beyond the courtroom to the stationhouse, silence in the
courtroom receives substantially more protection than silence in
75
76
interrogations. In Griffin v. California, the Supreme Court
established that prosecutors may not comment on a defendant’s
silence at trial, as that argument raises the cost of asserting the Fifth
77
Amendment privilege. Conversely, defendants cannot escape
comments equating silence with guilt when the silence occurred in
conversation with law enforcement. A defendant’s post-arrest silence,
after receiving Miranda warnings, is sufficiently “ambiguous” to
78
preclude admission. Pre-Miranda silence, however, even when a
79
defendant is under arrest, still constitutes impeachment material.
The law thus treats silent responses during noncustodial
questioning as substantively unambiguous. Pre-arrest silence signifies
a telling failure to deny or consciousness of wrongdoing. On the other
hand, silence is procedurally ambivalent throughout investigative
encounters. Rather than serving as a clear refusal to engage or an
effective invocation of rights, at best it delays questioning and
“confession.” Of course, silence can preface a truthful and accurate
statement, but its breach often leads to the unreliable governmentcreated evidence as well. Interrogation practices on the ground,
73. Id. at 471, 473.
74. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1544 (2008)
(noting police training materials that “tell[] officers that they may use the full toolkit of
interrogation tactics . . . to question a non-custodial suspect at the stationhouse”).
75. Compare Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (holding that the state’s use of
pre-arrest silence for impeachment does not unduly burden the Fifth Amendment right), with
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328–29 (1999) (concluding that no negative inferences
may be drawn from the failure to testify at the sentencing phase), Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 25–26 (1967) (identifying reversible error where the prosecution repeatedly commented
on defendant’s failure to testify), and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment forbids remarks by either judge or prosecutor on defendant’s failure
to testify at trial).
76. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
77. See id. at 613–15.
78. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
79. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982).
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however, take no account of the connection between silence and the
integrity of the investigation.
1. Substantive Silence. The Supreme Court’s most recent
decision concerning police interviews that occur prior to arrest
further encroaches on the protection that silence can provide by way
80
of separation. According to the reasoning in Salinas v. Texas, silence
constitutes a substantive admission of guilt if maintained in a
81
noncustodial setting. And even stationhouse interviews that are
functionally official can be labeled noncustodial if they lack the
82
formal indicia of arrests. In Salinas, the defendant Genovevo Salinas
voluntarily went to a Houston police station to answer questions
83
about the 1992 murder of two brothers. As he was not in custody
during questioning, the case did not implicate Miranda but instead
addressed the broader evidentiary significance and admissibility of
pre-arrest silence under the Fifth Amendment. Over the course of an
hour, Salinas answered all of the officers’ questions save one. When
asked if the shotgun casings found at the scene of the crime would
match a shotgun retrieved from the home he shared with his parents,
Salinas exhibited nervous behavior—reportedly looking down at the
floor, shuffling his feet, biting his lip, clenching his hands, and
84
“tighten[ing] up” —but he gave no verbal response. After he stayed
80. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).
81. Id. at 2178. Prior to the 2013 Salinas decision, the lower courts had diverged on the use
of a defendant’s silence, as both substantive evidence and impeachment, when the silence
occurred pre-arrest and pre-Miranda warnings. See United States v. Ashley, 664 F.3d 602, 604
(5th Cir. 2011) (documenting the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ difference with the First,
Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth). Compare United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 677–78 (4th Cir.
2004) (holding that both implicit and explicit advice to the defendant to remain silent precludes
the use of silence against the defendant at trial, but only post-arrest); United States v. Oplinger,
150 F.3d 1061, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by United States v. Contreras, 593 F.3d 1135
(9th Cir. 2010) (using pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt does not violate the
Fifth Amendment); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 & n.12 (11th Cir. 1991)
(custody does not preclude comment on silence in response to questioning if Miranda warnings
have not been given), with Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 282 (6th Cir. 2000) (use of pre-arrest,
pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence violates constitutional rights); United States v.
Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 1991) (plain error to admit silence in response to
allegations); and United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 1987)
(defendant has the constitutional right to say nothing in response to allegations, and this right to
silence does not exist solely in the context of Miranda warnings).
82. See, e.g., FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 89 (5th ed. 2011) (advising the use of formal
interrogations that remain technically extra-custodial to avoid giving Miranda warnings).
83. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.
84. Id.
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silent for a few moments, police changed the subject, and Salinas
85
continued answering questions. He was arrested immediately after
questioning on outstanding traffic warrants but subsequently released
because prosecutors did not believe they had sufficient evidence to
86
charge him. Salinas was later indicted for murder, convicted, and
87
sentenced to twenty years in prison. At trial, prosecutors cited his
failure to respond to the ballistics question as evidence of his guilt. In
closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that an innocent person
asked about the shotgun shells would have said, “What are you
88
talking about? I didn’t do that. I wasn’t there.”
The Court ruled 5-4 that this inference from Salinas’s silence was
a permissible argument because the Fifth Amendment privilege is not
89
“self-executing.” Justice Alito’s opinion for the plurality of the
Court concluded that Salinas failed to invoke his Fifth Amendment
right, and that invocation is required except when a criminal
defendant has declined to take the stand at trial, or where there is
90
government coercion rendering a statement involuntary. Because
Salinas was neither a nontestifying defendant protected by Griffin nor
a suspect subjected to the inherently coercive environment of
custodial interrogation, the silent response received no protection. To
escape the evidentiary significance of pausing and remaining silent
during questioning, the Court held that suspects—in some affirmative
91
terms not specified in the opinion—must assert their rights.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Petition for A Writ of
Certiorari at 5, Salinas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (No. 12-246) (quoting the trial record).
89. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 485 U.S. 420, 425 (1984)).
90. Id. at 2179–80. Justice Alito’s opinion announcing the decision was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring only
in the judgment.
91. Id. at 2182. Justice Thomas, writing for himself and Justice Scalia, argued that whether
or not Salinas had invoked the Fifth Amendment, his silence would still constitute admissible
evidence against him because the prosecutor’s comments did nothing to compel him within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Mitchell v.
United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he threat of an adverse
inference does not ‘compel’ anyone to testify. . . . [I]in most instances, a guilty defendant would
choose to remain silent despite the adverse inference, on the theory that it would do him less
damage than his cross-examined testimony.”)). Indeed, Justice Thomas indicated that he would
overrule the 1965 Griffin decision and permit prosecutors to comment on defendants’ silence.
See id.
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A more nuanced understanding of the expressive function of
silence emerges from Justice Breyer’s dissent. Commenting on silence
does, in the dissent’s view, compel a defendant to testify against
92
himself. As the Miranda Court concluded, no use should be made at
trial of “the fact that [the defendant] stood mute or claimed his
93
privilege in the face of accusation.” Even in precustodial encounters,
because silence can communicate implied assertions of fact or belief,
it can also be “testimonial” within the meaning of the Fifth
94
Amendment. Moreover, invocation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege should be recognized, according to the dissent, even absent
95
specific words or direct assertions. The relevant question is whether
one can “fairly infer from an individual’s silence and surrounding
96
circumstances an exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” The
majority’s reasoning in Salinas, however, precludes consideration of
silence for the one thing it seems well suited to communicate, which is
97
a suspect’s reluctance to engage. Instead, the decision supports the
use of silence as a confession, despite the substantive ambiguity of
silence, and the opening that it leaves for participation and
98
interpretation by the government.
2. Procedural Silence. Even in cases that clearly animate
Miranda’s protections, the Court has interpreted silence to the
government’s advantage. Not speaking to assert Fifth Amendment
rights can be enough to establish waiver. Take the defendant in
99
Berghuis v. Thompkins, a shooting suspect who sat in a straightbacked chair for almost three hours, making few audible noises, and

92. Id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
94. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496
U.S. 582, 596–97 (1990)).
95. Id. (“[N]o ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege.” (quoting
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955))).
96. Id. at 2191 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. The Second Circuit recently addressed a question left open in Salinas: whether the
government can introduce in its case in chief the mere fact that a defendant invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination during questioning. See United States v. Okatan, 728 F.3d
111 (2d Cir. 2013). In Okatan, the court concluded that allowing prosecutors to comment on the
assertion of the Fifth Amendment would penalize the defendant’s exercise of his constitutional
right. Id. at 121.
98. For a discussion of the interpretive potential of silence, see supra notes 10–31 and
accompanying text.
99. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
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refusing to respond to law enforcement’s questions. Throughout a
lengthy accusatory monologue by police, Thompkins sustained neartotal silence—punctuated only by a few nods of his head, a moment
when he rejected the offer of a peppermint, and a comment that his
101
chair was uncomfortably hard. Though Thompkins received his
Miranda warnings and acknowledged that he understood them, he
102
declined to sign the written waiver of his rights. At the end of this
interrogation, a detective asked if Thompkins believed in God, and he
responded audibly with one word: “Yes.” Thompkins was then asked
if he prayed to God, and he again answered “yes.” And finally, the
detective said, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that
boy down?” Thompkins once more said “yes,” but thereafter refused
103
to make a written confession. The Michigan trial court admitted his
three “yes” responses into evidence, and Thompkins was convicted of
104
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
When the case reached the Sixth Circuit on habeas review, the
court held that Thompkins’ “persistent silence for nearly three hours
in response to questioning and repeated invitations to tell his side of
the story offered a clear and unequivocal message to the officers:
105
Thompkins did not wish to waive his rights.” The Supreme Court
reversed, in another 5-4 decision, reasoning that the silence itself was
insignificant because the “yes” responses were uncoerced and
106
established “an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.” The
Court further concluded that allowing silence itself to serve as an
invocation of the right to be silent would complicate law
107
enforcement’s ability to determine a suspect’s intent. Thus the
ambiguity of silence operates only in law enforcement’s favor. That
analysis marks a clear departure from the Miranda decision itself,

100. Id. at 374–76.
101. Id. at 375–76.
102. Id. at 375.
103. Id. at 376.
104. Thompkins v. Berghuis, No. 05-CV-70188-DT, 2006 WL 2811303, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 28, 2006); see Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 378.
105. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 379 (citation omitted).
106. Id. at 384, 388–89.
107. Id. at 382; see also Green v. Commonwealth, 500 S.E.2d 835, 839 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)
(deciding that suspect who told police to “buckle up for the long ride,” turned his chair away,
closed his eyes, and sat silently for two hours was not invoking the right to silence).
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which stated that neither silence nor a subsequent confession could
108
amount to a valid waiver.
For suspects, it has grown increasingly difficult to assert and
maintain the right to stay silent. Only by verbally and explicitly
invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege can one silence questions.
Once the privilege is successfully invoked, interrogators in theory will
“scrupulously honor[]” it by ceasing questioning, and will resume
engagement only after time has passed and new warnings have been
109
issued. If a specific request for the assistance of an attorney has
been made, questioning must stop altogether and cannot continue
without counsel present, unless the defendant reinitiates the interview
110
and waives her rights. That request for legal assistance, however,
must be not only specific but also sustained. The defendant in Davis
111
v. United States, for example, endured an hour and a half of
questioning in silence, and then said, “Maybe I should talk to a
112
lawyer.” The Court found that statement too equivocal to constitute
113
a request for counsel.
The high standards for invoking the right to stop questioning
produce many failed attempts at silence. Invocation must be
114
unmistakable, and it must be out loud. Any ambivalence allows
questioning to continue over time, and silence is always construed as
ambivalent. As Justice Sotomayor noted in her Berghuis dissent, “[A]
suspect who wishes to guard his right to remain silent against such a
finding of ‘waiver’ must, counterintuitively, speak—and must do so
with sufficient precision to satisfy a clear-statement rule that
115
construes ambiguity in favor of the police.” Her opinion catalogues
a variety of direct statements deemed too ambiguous to constitute
invocation—including “I’m not going to talk about nothin[g]”; “I just
don’t think that I should say anything”; “I don’t even want to, you
108. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (stating that demonstrating
waiver places a “heavy burden” on the government and rejecting the possibility of waiver on a
“silent record”), with Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 383 (“The course of decisions since Miranda . . .
demonstrates that waivers can be established even absent formal or express statements . . . .”).
109. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
110. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 478–87 (1981); see also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462
U.S. 1039, 1044–45 (1983) (noting that an inquiry into whether a waiver is valid includes
determining whether the accused reopened dialogue with authorities).
111. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
112. Id. at 455.
113. Id. at 459–62.
114. See id. at 459 (requiring that the request for counsel be unambiguous).
115. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 391 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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know what I’m saying, discuss no more about it”; “I wish to not say
116
any more”; and “I’d like to be done with this.” It is no wonder that
so few defendants can successfully invoke the right to silence when it
is insufficient simply to state “I got nothin[g] more to say to you. I’m
117
done. This is over.”
It is true that a suspect can, technically, neither waive nor invoke,
and instead remain completely silent and wait out law enforcement’s
tactics. But precedents like Berghuis encourage law enforcement “to
question a suspect at length—notwithstanding his persistent refusal to
answer questions—in the hope of eventually obtaining a single
118
inculpatory response which will suffice to prove waiver of rights.”
The boundary that silence seeks to create is simply unsustainable in
the face of prolonged interrogation.
As a result, attempted silence rarely serves any purpose helpful
to the defendant. The negative space around it gets interpreted as
assent, but it does not succeed as a positive assertion of rights or as an
objection. And the real danger of encroaching on silence arises once
these permissive rules encourage its breach and defendants do begin
to speak.
3. Broken Silence and the Problem of Co-Authorship. When the
significance of silence as an assertion goes unnoticed, and
interrogators succeed in breaking silence, the resulting statements are
only partly of a suspect’s own making. Manipulating a subject into
compliance often means that a confession contains intentional or
unintentional distortions as well. The datasets recently generated by
Innocence Projects reveal the leading role that false confessions play
in wrongful convictions and a high incidence of government-created
119
evidence within those false confessions.
Brandon Garrett’s
landmark study identifies forty false confessions to rape or murder
120
among the first 250 cases involving DNA exonerations. Ninety116. Id. at 411 n.9 (quoting United States v. Sherrod, 445 F.3d 980, 982 (7th Cir. 2006);
Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 200 (4th Cir. 2000); State v. Jackson, 839 N.E.2d 362, 373
(Ohio 2006); State v. Deen, 953 So. 2d 1057, 1058–60 (La. Ct. App. 2007)).
117. State v. Saeger, No. 2009AP2133–CR, 2010 WL 3155264, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 11,
2010) (alteration in original).
118. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 404 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
119. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 16, at 18–19; SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 121
(concluding that the existence of false confessions is “indisputable” given exonerations based on
DNA evidence).
120. Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1051
(2010). More than half of those false confessions were associated with dispositional
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seven percent of those statements included specific, nonpublic details
121
about how the crime occurred. For example, defendant Jeffrey
Deskovic, whose story Garrett recounts, drew accurate diagrams of
three different crime scenes of which he had no actual knowledge. He
was convicted and served sixteen years in prison before he was
122
exonerated.
Many criminal justice scholars have turned their attention to the
123
puzzling mechanisms of contaminated confessions,
but the
relationship between a suspect’s initial silence and those statements is
not well understood. Silence may constitute the only accurate
contribution that a suspect can offer, and the statement least likely to
124
deceive. Yet investigators often undervalue it, and may even find it
discomfiting. Forbearance in an interrogation can appear
confrontational when law enforcement assumes guilty knowledge on
125
126
the part of the suspect. Police want to assert their authority,
enhance the efficiency of the investigation, and extract information
127
they view as essential to solving the crime.
Moreover, confessional speech, in Western culture, has a “prime
mark of authenticity” and is “par excellence the kind of speech in
characteristics such as youth, disability, or mental illness, id. at 1064, but many of them involved
transmission of non-public facts to the defendant by law enforcement, id. at 1057. This
contamination problem now appears “epidemic, not episodic” when it comes to false
confessions. Laura H. Nirider, Joshua A. Tepfer & Steven A. Drizin, Combating Contamination
in Confession Cases, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 837, 846–49 (2012).
121. Garrett, supra note 120, at 1054.
122. GARRETT, supra note 16, at 15–17.
123. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, A Critical Appraisal of Modern Police Interrogations, in
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: RIGHTS, RESEARCH AND REGULATION 207, 208 (Tom
Williamson ed., 2006); Sara C. Appleby, Lisa E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, Police-Induced
Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of Their Content and Impact, 19 PSYCH. CRIME & L. 111,
111 (2011).
124. See, e.g., Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law & Literature, 8
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 27 (1996) (“[T]he speech act of confession is a dubious guide to the
truth, which must rather be sought in the resistance to such speech.”).
125. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Why Interrogation Contamination Occurs, 11 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 193, 197 (2013) (describing the American method of interrogation as “guiltpresumptive,” “accusatory,” and driven by “adversarial assumptions”).
126. See Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1435, 1446 (2009) (discussing the state’s motivation to charge “insubordinate individuals . . .
solely because their acts constitute an affront to the formal dignity or authority of the state”).
127. Cf. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (linking the express invocation
requirement to the government’s “right” to testimony); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
443 (1972) (noting the “general common-law principle that ‘the public has a right to every man’s
evidence,’” in the context of the government’s power to compel testimony by granting immunity
(footnote omitted)).
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Both
which the individual authenticates his inner truth.”
investigators and fact-finders highly prize confessions because they
appear to address the intractable intersubjectivity problem: an
individual’s own statement seems the best proof of her state of
129
mind. In many cases, what “really happened” is not otherwise
accessible to investigators, and the prospects for identifying any
130
actionable offense turn on overcoming a suspect’s silence.
It is true, of course, that most suspects talk, and some of them
make the affirmative choice (albeit an ill-considered one) to do so.
More than 80 percent of suspects waive their right to silence once
advised of it, and the majority of interrogations yield some form of
131
incriminating statement. Factually innocent suspects often waive
because they believe they have nothing to fear, while guilty ones
132
often conclude that waiver will make them appear less culpable.
133
“[W]ith the right combination of alibi and excuse,” they imagine
they will parry questions successfully.
Another set of suspects makes a meaningful attempt at silence
134
and still fails. The focus here is on this group because the statements

128. BROOKS, supra note 33, at 4.
129. Louis Michael Seidman, Some Stories About Confessions and Confessions About
Stories, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 162, 164 (Peter Brooks &
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (“[P]eople who confess offer a window into their true self.”); cf.
BROOKS, supra note 33, at 140 (“In a contemporary American culture characterized by
confessional discourse and multifarious therapeutic practice, a high value has come to be placed
on speaking confessionally . . . .”).
130. See Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1609 (“[The felt] need for confessions” arises from
“those crimes whose sole promise of solution rests on the interrogation and nothing but the
interrogation [where] the interrogation story is what happened because it provides all and the
only meaning we have.”); see also CONSTABLE, supra note 47, at 164–65 (discussing the way in
which confessions are both constative and performative).
131. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
260, 280 (1996) (reporting that 64 percent of interrogations yield incriminating statements, even
after adequate Miranda warnings and waivers).
132. See Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their “Miranda” Rights:
The Power of Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 217–18 (2004) (describing the results of
an experiment where 36 percent of guilty suspects “waived their rights . . . so that the detective
would not infer guilt from a lack of compliance” and 72 percent of innocent suspects who
“waived their rights said they did so . . . because they were innocent and had nothing to fear”).
As Peter Reilly, wrongfully convicted of murder after a false confession, explained, “‘My state
of mind was that I hadn’t done anything wrong and I felt that only a criminal really needed an
attorney, and this was all going to come out in the wash.’” Id. at 218 (citation omitted).
133. See SIMON, HOMICIDE, supra note 39, at 206.
134. Conversely, the criminal justice process imposes silence on defendants in the trial
setting, where speaking might contribute the most useful information to fact-finders. There, as
several commentators have noted, defendants are inhibited by the rules concerning
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they ultimately give to investigators often include critical elements
that the interrogators co-author. The resulting “government-created
evidence” has in turn been revealed as a significant source of error
135
that merits closer scrutiny. Some measure of participation from an
interrogator is inevitable, and most confessions are jointly produced
to an extent. Likewise, cross-examination in court can yield useful
and accurate testimony, even though it consists almost entirely of
statements by the examining lawyer. Even confessions that do
contribute to truth-seeking emerge through questioning and thus
include language generated by the government. As Anne Coughlin
writes, “shapely confessions”—statements that will advance the
government’s case in court, or strengthen its hand at plea
bargaining—“rarely, if ever, spring full-blown from the mouths of
136
criminal suspects.”
Though all evidence “comes” from the government in the sense
that the government gathers it in the investigative process and
137
presents it in order to meet the burden of proof, evidence that is
heavily influenced by the government yet purports to be from some
independent source can cause error. That flaw seems to emerge more
frequently when a suspect first chooses not to talk but then submits
after a prolonged silence. Although 90 percent of all interrogations
138
last no more than two hours, 90 percent of the exonerees in
Brandon Garrett’s dataset of wrongful convictions endured
interrogations that went on for more than three hours, and in some

impeachment, even though their testimony might have high value. See Barbara Allen Babcock,
Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1993) (advocating for broader
protections for defendants who choose to take the stand in order to introduce their own stories
into the trial); Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules
That Encourage Defendants To Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 897 (2008) (arguing that the
current legal framework with disincentives to defendant testimony “cavalierly squanders a rich
testimonial resource [the defendant] at great cost to the search for truth and with little benefit”);
Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449,
1451 (2005) (identifying “systemic implications for the integrity of the justice process” that stem
from defendant silence).
135. Garrett, supra note 8, at 408 (noting that “[c]onfession contamination is
overwhelmingly prevalent in false confessions among persons exonerated by DNA tests”).
136. Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1602.
137. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966) (“[E]ven the guilty
are not to be convicted unless the prosecution ‘shoulder[s] the entire load.’”); see also, e.g.,
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325 (1999) (citing “the long tradition and vital principle
that criminal proceedings rely on accusations proved by the Government, not on inquisitions
conducted to enhance its own prosecutorial power”).
138. Leo, supra note 131, at 279.
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In protracted encounters, law
cases took place over days.
enforcement “maintains control of the storytelling, so that the suspect
is put in a position of denying or affirming—often, affirming through
denials that lead to entrapment—the unfolding narrative that . . . is
140
largely of the interrogator’s own making.”
Despite the assumption that the evidence in the accused’s own
141
words always represents “the most reliable evidence we can have,”
contaminated confessions contain few salient facts that are actually
the accused’s own statements. The extent to which interrogators
participate in the construction of statements requires some
calibration, and what happened when attempted silence failed is often
quite telling with regard to the degree of government participation.
The moment when silence is breached contains information not only
about whether involuntary testimony was elicited from a defendant’s
142
“own mouth,” but also about whether the government put words in
the defendant’s mouth. Recent assessments of unconfronted hearsay
143
144
statements, suggestive eyewitness identifications, and statements
145
of jailhouse informants underscore this problem of governmentcreated evidence. But false confessions may best illustrate the
139. GARRETT, supra note 16, at 38; see also Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the
Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 105,
145 (1997) (“[M]ore than five hours of continuous interrogation may create a substantial risk
that the suspect will acquiesce to police suggestions . . . .”).
140. BROOKS, supra note 33, at 40; see also Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1608–09 (describing
the interrogator as “not merely finding but creating, not merely reconstructing but constructing,
the solution to the crime”).
141. BROOKS, supra note 33, at 15; see also id. (suggesting that the perceived reliability of
confessions allows that “[w]hen someone confesses, his judges may proceed to condemn him
with a good conscience”).
142. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“[O]ur accusatory system of criminal
justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of
compelling it from his own mouth.”); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (stating that
“society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out of his own mouth”
but “by evidence independently secured through skillful investigation”).
143. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004) (emphasizing that “even if the
Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object,
and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class”).
144. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 726 (2012) (“A primary aim of excluding
identification evidence obtained under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances . . . is to deter law
enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in the first place.”).
145. See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 124 (describing how informants’ statements in cases of
wrongful convictions often appeared “made to order” and included “details designed to
undermine the defendant’s alibi, address weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, or enhance
prosecution evidence”).
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investigative interstices where government agents can knowingly or
146
unknowingly manipulate inputs.
Although interrogation regulation has been slow to change, the
social science research demonstrating that “innocent individuals are
surprisingly easily seduced to falsely confess a crime” has
147
proliferated. Researchers have demonstrated that subjects will not
only succumb to the pressures of interrogation but will then
internalize false memories of committing a crime. In a recent study,
70 percent of a group of Canadian undergraduate students reported
episodic memories of committing crimes after exposure to
148
misinformation in a controlled experimental setting. Interrogation
techniques can thus put words not only in suspects’ mouths but in
their memories. In a realm where complicating the very idea of
authorship is part of the point, confounding the identity of the
“performers” in 4’33” expands the meaning of the piece. 4’33” is “full
of sound,” Cage explained, that he “did not think of beforehand,” but
149
heard “for the first time the same time others hear[d].” But blurring
those lines is not desirable when law enforcement participates in
creating evidence, and that evidence is then central to a finding of
criminal liability.
II. THE NEW ACCURACY IMPERATIVE
Government-created evidence requires close scrutiny, but this
sort of attention to substantive reliability has been labeled the

146. Id. at 8–9 (identifying false confessions and tainted eyewitness identifications as
prominent causes of wrongful convictions); see also Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, Daniel J.
Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata Patil, Exonerations in the United States 1989
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 543 (2005).
147. Eric Rassin & Han Israëls, False Confession in the Lab: A Review, 7 ERASMUS L. REV.
219, 222 (2014).
148. Julia Shaw & Stephen Porter, Constructing Rich False Memories of Committing Crime,
26 PSYCHOL. SCI. 291, 296 (2015).
149. Letter from John Cage to Helen Wolff (1954), in 4’33”: JOHN CAGE CENTENNIAL
EDITION, supra note 10, at 35. Cage wrote that the piece was never actually silent:
What we hear is determined by our own emptiness, our own receptivity; we receive to
the extent we are empty to do so. If one is full or in the course of its performance
becomes full of an idea, for example, that this piece is a trick for shock and
bewilderment then it is just that.
Id.; see also Kania, supra note 12, at 347 (concluding that even a member of the audience yelling
“This is rubbish!” and storming out of the theater would plausibly count as part of the 4’33”
performance).
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“largely forgotten purpose of the rules.” That is particularly the case
when epistemic competence conflicts with other goals of criminal
151
procedure. According to William Stuntz, Warren Court criminal
152
The
procedure often detracted from substantive accuracy.
bureaucratic imperatives of the criminal justice system can further
“sideline[] the accuracy of its somber endeavor in favor of a slew of
153
other goals, interests, and constraints.” The Court, of course, has at
154
times emphasized the “truth-seeking function of the trial process”
and has noted the “general goal of establishing ‘procedures under
which criminal defendants are acquitted or convicted on the basis of
155
all the evidence which exposes the truth.’” And in other contexts—
including the due process right to material exculpatory information
and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel—the Court continues to
156
cite verdict accuracy as an important goal.
Accuracy has rarely figured, however, in contemporary
discussions of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. In nineteenth century cases extending the privilege
from the courtroom to investigative confessions, the Court did cite
157
reliability concerns alongside autonomy rationales.
Coercive
150. Richard A. Leo, Steven A. Drizin, Peter J. Neufeld, Bradley R. Hall & Amy Vatner,
Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First
Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 486.
151. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth & Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 289–90 (2013)
(stating that the goals of trial are more complex than “finding facts”); see also, e.g., Darryl K.
Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183, 211 (2014)
(“Constitutional rights to introduce evidence and confront state witnesses serve political norms
that value individual autonomy and process participation, independent of whether they improve
accuracy in trial judgments.”).
152. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
781, 818–19 (2006).
153. Dan Simon, Criminal Law at the Crossroads: Turn to Accuracy, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 421,
440 (2014).
154. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
155. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
900–901 (1984)).
156. See, e.g., id. (stating that Brady standards are driven by the “general goal of establishing
procedures under which criminal defendants are acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the
evidence which exposes the truth”); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (holding
that effective counsel fulfills the “duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render
the trial a reliable adversarial testing process”); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)
(noting that the presence of defense counsel tests the government’s case and thereby can
produce a more accurate result).
157. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541–44 (1897); cf. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 285–87 (1936) (recognizing the fundamental unfairness of using an untrustworthy
confession).
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interrogation techniques were expressly disfavored because they
overrode the presumption that “one who is innocent will not imperil
158
his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.” But the
1966 Miranda decision itself makes only passing mention of
159
160
accuracy, and few subsequent cases discuss it at all. In Colorado v.
161
Connelly, the Court flatly stated that reliability is solely the
162
The purpose of the voluntariness
province of evidence law.
requirement, according to the Court’s reasoning, is to “prevent
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or
163
false.”
Yet concern with the reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
is on the rise in criminal procedure scholarship. As Daniel Medwed
explains, both advocacy and commentary on criminal law have turned
164
to “innocentrism,” and factual integrity is newly central. There is
both heightened awareness of error in investigations and trials and
greater understanding that the (often unwitting) participation of
police and prosecutors in the creation of evidence can lead to
165
incorrect results. Greater attention to the significance and status of
silence would correspond with this renewed focus on the quality of
evidence and the accuracy of verdicts.

158. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884).
159. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 n.24 (1966).
160. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (“The fundamental purpose of this
Court’s decision in Miranda” is to safeguard the right to “choose between speech and silence.”
(emphasis omitted)). But see Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (stating that
Miranda can protect against unreliable statements).
161. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
162. Id. at 167 (“A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be
proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the
forum . . . and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
163. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)). But see
Yale Kamisar, What Is an “Involuntary” Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid’s
Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 742 (1963) (“[W]hatever the
current meaning of the elusive terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ confessions, originally the
terminology was a substitute for the ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘reliability’ test.”).
164. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1558–64.
165. See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction
Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 37 (“Over the past decade, DNA technology challenged the Court’s
assumption of guilt with the postconviction exoneration of mounting numbers of innocent
people.”).
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A. Wrongful Convictions
Reclaiming the instrumental rationale for protecting silence finds
its primary support in recent empirical developments. DNA testing
has established the existence of “known innocents” in the criminal
justice process, in significant numbers, and it suggests a wider
166
population of unidentified innocents. Innocence Projects are a
relatively new phenomenon, but the exonerations of the past twenty
years have begun to shift paradigms in criminal procedure. The
167
empirical data has given rise to a new accuracy imperative.
Wrongful convictions were once more theoretical than real. They
were debated in academic terms about the validity of Blackstone’s
ratio: “[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
168
suffer.” But error in criminal adjudication is no longer a theoretical
issue, and the wrongfully convicted defendant is more than a “ghost”
169
that haunts the criminal justice process like an “unreal dream.” The
debate about wrongful convictions has largely moved past skepticism
about their occurrence.
Furthermore, as popular accounts of the incidence, causes, and
170
impact of wrongful convictions have proliferated, they have also
166. See Gross et al., supra note 146, at 531 (“Beneath the surface there are other
undetected miscarriages of justice in rape cases without testable DNA, and a much larger group
of undetected false convictions in robberies and other serious crimes of violence for which DNA
identification is useless.”); see also Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and
Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 937–40 (2008) (detailing the problem of exonerations as a “small
and unrepresentative sample of all false convictions”); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents
Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 761, 779–80 (2007) (calculating the rate of wrongful convictions in capital rapemurder cases in the 1980s to be 3.3–5%); Adam Liptak, Consensus on Counting the Innocent:
We Can’t, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/us/25bar.html [http://
perma.cc/D2J2-8HYJ] (explaining that, outside of the context of a small sample of murder and
rape cases, “we know almost nothing about the number of innocent people in prison”). But see
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (extrapolating from editorial
and empirical challenges to the existence of wrongful convictions to conclude that the error rate
is actually 0.027 percent).
167. See Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence
Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 134, 146–47
(2008) (discussing the “Reliability Model” based on best practices that emerges from the
“Innocence Movement.”).
168. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free.”); Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 173 (1997).
169. United States v. Garrison, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Judge Learned Hand).
170. See, e.g., MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL
WASHINGTON, JR. (2003); JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN
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raised broader awareness of the potential for error. Indeed, the
“attention paid to actual innocence by litigators, academics,
legislators, authors, and even television executives signals a new era
in which fact-based arguments surrounding guilt or innocence may
begin to trump or at least hold their own with the traditional rightsbased arguments that have been the norm in criminal law for
171
generations.” With that raised awareness comes an imperative to
consider best practices with regard to the reliability of investigative
techniques, including interrogations.
B. Silence and Innocence
Now that “constitutional error no longer appears as a procedural
172
the
technicality asserted by a probably guilty [defendant],”
heightened prospect of innocence requires new thinking about silence
as well. Hundreds of demonstrably false confessions have contributed
to wrongful convictions, and various studies document cases in which
173
silence could have protected factual innocence.
Whether an

SMALL TOWN (2006); DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO
CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012); DAVID PROTESS & ROB WARDEN, A
PROMISE OF JUSTICE: THE EIGHTEEN-YEAR FIGHT TO SAVE FOUR INNOCENT MEN (1998);
BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JAMES DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); JENNIFER
THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD COTTON & ERIN TOMEO, PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF
INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009); TOM WELLS & RICHARD A. LEO, THE WRONG GUYS:
MURDER, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008).
171. Medwed, supra note 164, at 1551; see also Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism:
Accounting for Deference in Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 786
(2014) (“The magnitude of our criminal justice system’s accuracy problem is widely debated, but
the notion that it is nontrivial and that greater attention to pretrial activities is an important part
of the solution is widely accepted.”). The enormous success of the “Serial” podcast—which
attracted millions of listeners and raised awareness about potential inaccuracies—exemplifies
the emerging concern with reliability. See, e.g., Matt Schiavenza, Serial’s Second Act, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/02/serials-secondact/385287 [http://perma.cc/7LT6-WBC7].
172. Garrett, supra note 165, at 38; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 71 (1997) (“[E]ven an innocent person may say
seemingly inculpatory things under pressure and suspicion and when flustered by trained
inquisitors.”); GARRETT, supra note 16, at 18 (“While we do not know how often false
confessions occur, there is a new awareness among scholars, legislators, judges, prosecutors,
police departments, and the public that innocent people can falsely confess, often due to
psychological pressure placed upon them during police interrogations.”).
173. E.g., Steven A, Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the PostDNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004); cf. David K. Shipler, Why Do Innocent People
Confess?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at SR6 (stating that false confessions have figured in a
quarter of the wrongful convictions identified by the Innocence Project and that because “DNA
A
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interrogator succeeds in overcoming a suspect’s silent resistance and
eliciting an incriminating statement appears “only loosely related to
174
the suspect’s actual guilt.” Moreover, because most cases involving
disputed confessions are “unreported by the media, unacknowledged
by police and prosecutors, and unrecognized by researchers, the
documented cases of interrogation-induced false confessions almost
175
certainly understate the true extent of the phenomenon.”
Early encounters with suspects and witnesses in which police
produce rather than discover evidence are significant sources of
epistemic incompetence at trial. That is true of witness interviews and
176
eyewitness identifications, and it is a particularly acute problem
when it comes to interrogations. Often inadvertently, law
177
enforcement can create and then misattribute evidence. According
to Dan Simon, “almost all of the DNA exonerees who falsely
confessed provided detailed accounts of their purported criminal act”
including “details that were not publicly known” and were “somehow
178
communicated to the ignorant innocent confessors.”
Simon’s
analysis also underscores why criminal adjudication can be a poor
audit mechanism for invalid co-authored confessions. The very
factors that make a false confession unreliable contribute to the rich
narratives that make them appear credible. One of Miranda’s fiercest
critics, Ronald Allen, has asked why it would “be a better world if
some randomly chosen set of individuals, who otherwise would
179
confess, did not?” The empirical and social science insights of the

is available in just a fraction of all crimes, a much larger universe of erroneous convictions—and
false confessions—surely exists”).
174. MEDWED, supra note 170 (focusing on prosecutorial decision making and biased
processing of evidence such as false confessions); SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 139.
175. Richard A. Leo, False Confessions and the Constitution: Problems, Possibilities, and
Solutions, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 171
(John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., 2013); see also Gross & O’Brien, supra note 166, at
937–40 (noting that we “have inadequate information about the underlying investigations” in
cases of false convictions “and we cannot compare them to correct convictions because we know
even less about the investigations that lead to criminal convictions in general”).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 143–46; see also GARRETT, supra note 16, at 8–9
(identifying tainted eyewitness identifications as another prominent cause of wrongful
convictions).
177. See Leo, supra note 125, at 198 (“American police interrogation has no internal
corrective mechanism to catch or reverse investigators’ pre-interrogation classification errors or
their confirmatory, information-conveying interrogation techniques.”).
178. SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 136.
179. Ronald J. Allen, The Misguided Defenses of Miranda v. Arizona, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 205, 212 (2007).
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new reliability scholarship provide the answer: because some of those
“lost” confessions would have been inaccurate.
Recognizing the connection between silence and reliability helps
to move the discussion about regulating interrogations beyond the
question of whether silence protects the innocent as well as the guilty.
Jeremy Bentham long ago advanced the idea that only guilty suspects
choose silence, and that any false evidence against innocent suspects
who talk will be detected and rejected in the marketplace of
adjudication. A well-known passage from his 1825 treatise states that
if “all the criminals of every class had assembled, and framed a system
after their own wishes, is not this rule the very first which they would
have established for their security? Innocence never takes advantage
of it; innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the
180
privilege of silence.”
Scholars have been debating whether silence weighs in favor of
the innocent or the guilty ever since, using various social science and
181
theoretical lenses. Daniel Seidmann and Alex Stein, for example,
constructed a game theory model to counter Bentham’s utilitarian
182
approach. In their account, the right to silence lowers the conviction
rate for innocents by making their exculpatory accounts believable.
Guilty criminals stay silent rather than offer dishonest exculpatory
accounts, and because their stories do not “pool” with those of
183
innocents, true exonerating accounts emerge as more credible. In
contrast, Larry Laudan and Erik Lillquist recently made a claim
echoing Bentham’s, that protections around silence “seem to work
primarily to the advantage of the guilty defendant and to do little if
184
anything to protect the interests of innocent ones.”
180. JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 241 (1825).
181. Compare Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged
Cases of Wrongful Convictions from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 564–68
(1999) (suggesting that many cases treated as “wrongful convictions” do not involve factually
innocent defendants), with Schulhofer, supra note 69, at 562 (“Miranda does not protect
suspects from conviction but only from a particular method of conviction.”).
182. Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A GameTheoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 433 (2000) (“[T]he
right to silence helps to distinguish the guilty from the innocent by inducing an anti-pooling
effect that enhances the credibility of innocent suspects.”); Alex Stein, The Right to Silence
Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2008) (“The right
to silence minimizes this pooling effect, thereby reducing the incidence of wrongful convictions,
by providing guilty criminals a strong incentive to separate from the pool.”).
183. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 182, at 433.
184. Larry Laudan & Erik Lillquist, The Sounds of Silence 4 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law
Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 215, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.
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Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is not only a “shelter to the guilty” but also a
185
“protection to the innocent,” some Justices have expressed similar
skepticism about the connection between silence and innocence.
Justice Cardozo remarked that justice “would not perish if the
186
accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry.” And
Justice Scalia declared—in an opinion referencing the anticoercion
rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination—that while the
guilty face the “cruel trilemma” of self-accusation, perjury, or
187
contempt, the innocent “lack[] even a ‘lemma.’”
Versions of Justice Scalia’s conception of the carefree innocent
defendant surface in commentary on the Fifth Amendment as well.
Ronald Allen and Kristen Mace agree that “an innocent person faces
188
no trilemma.” Stephen Schulhofer, who otherwise supports the
privilege, concludes that the innocent defendant “faces no trilemma,
189
no dilemma, in fact no problem at all.” Relatedly, Judge Richard
Posner has written that judges “who want jurors to take seriously the
principle that guilt should not be inferred from a refusal to waive the
privilege against self-incrimination will have to come up with a
credible explanation for why an innocent person might fear the
consequences of testifying” and has questioned whether there is any
190
such “credible explanation.”
But of course there are many explanations for refusing to speak
within the criminal justice process, including the realities of stress,
fear, anger, and confusion in any law enforcement encounter. As the
Tenth Circuit has observed, it is “common knowledge that most
citizens . . . whether innocent or guilty, when confronted by a law
enforcement officer who asks them potentially incriminating

com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2037575_code515373.pdf?abstractid=2037575&mirid=1 [http://
perma.cc/4CUV-58UK].
185. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908).
186. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
187. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 404 (1998) (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55).
188. Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its
Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 244 (2004).
189. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 318 (1991).
190. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1534–35 (1999).
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questions are likely to exhibit some signs of nervousness.”
Relatedly, Matthew Martoma, who was recently convicted of
securities fraud, successfully moved to preclude from his trial any
discussion of the fact that he fainted when first approached by FBI
192
agents investigating the case. “The mere accusation,” the trial court
agreed, “could well have an enormous impact on [the accused’s]
professional and personal life,” and “it is just as likely that he fainted
simply from shock, surprise, or alarm at being accused of such a
193
serious crime.”
Moreover, the idea that innocents have nothing to fear from
responding to police is flat wrong. Innocent defendants have good
reason for distrusting authority and holding their peace. Silence may
be not only a powerful instinct but also the best strategy, even for the
194
factually innocent.
Factually innocent suspects confront quite
weighty “lemmas” of their own. They choose speech or silence, and if
they speak, they elect whether to tell partial truths to enhance their
otherwise honest account of innocence. Any statements they give can
cause tactical damage to their later positions at trial, by compromising
an alibi or by creating impeachment material from small
inconsistencies. As Justice Breyer recognized, dissenting in Salinas, a
suspect who answers an accusatory question may reveal “prejudicial
facts, disreputable associates, or suspicious circumstances—even if he
195
is innocent.” Investigators approach suspects with a tendency to
perceive them as guilty, and almost anything a suspect says will serve
196
to confirm that suspicion. To make matters worse, defensive
dishonesty by an innocent defendant can give rise to liability for an
197
entirely new offense, such as obstruction or a false statement.

191. United States v. Millan-Diaz, 975 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1992).
192. Order at 1, 4, United States v. Martoma, 990 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014).
193. Id. at 3.
194. See, e.g., Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 285 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here are many reasons
why a defendant may remain silent before arrest, such as a knowledge of his Miranda rights or a
fear that his story may not be believed.”); Commonwealth v. Molina, 104 A.3d 430, 450–51 (Pa.
2014) (“[A]llowing reference to a defendant’s silence as substantive evidence endangers the
truth-determining process given our recognition that individuals accused of a crime may remain
silent for any number of reasons.”).
195. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “You’re Guilty So Just Confess!” Cognitive
and Behavioral Confirmation Biases in the Interrogation Room, in INTERROGATIONS,
CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 85, 89 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004).
197. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1522 (2009).
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Innocents under interrogation also face the compound danger
that they will be manipulated into an inculpatory falsehood, and that
this “confession” will lead to their conviction. Innocence may even
supply the requisite circumstances for a false confession. It can be a
risk factor for wrongful convictions because of the misguided notion
that innocence is its own defense. Innocent suspects tend to believe
that the truth will eventually “set them free” and that they have little
198
to lose from cooperating and engaging with law enforcement. The
game theory model also assumes that “innocent defendants have only
one rational course of action,” which is “revealing their true self199
exonerating accounts.” That is not quite right either, however. The
most rational course of action is to say nothing at all, and that is
200
exactly what any competent lawyer would advise.
In other words, the prosecutor in Salinas was simply incorrect
that any innocent person questioned about the shotgun casings would
have responded, “What are you talking about? I didn’t do that. I
201
wasn’t there.” As the Supreme Court has previously stated—when
concluding that a defendant’s invocation of a Fifth Amendment
privilege before a grand jury cannot be used to impeach his later trial
testimony—silence in the face of questioning can be “wholly
202
consistent with innocence.” There is “no basis for declaring a
generalized probability” that the innocent are more likely than the
203
guilty to profess their innocence. Silence accurately responds as far
as it goes, protects against untrue statements and untoward
inferences, and preserves other rights surrounding the later decisions
about whether to proceed to trial and whether to testify.

198. For an account of how innocence increases the risk of false confessions, see generally
Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215 (2005).
199. Stein, supra note 182, at 1122–23. Seidmann and Stein’s express concern is to model the
positive effect of silent guilty defendants on testifying innocent ones, and as they acknowledge
“[t]he existence of silent innocents does not enter” into their model. Seidmann & Stein, supra
note 182, at 455 n.82.
200. As Justice Jackson plainly stated, “[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no
uncertain terms to make no statement to the police under any circumstances.” Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
201. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957).
203. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring).
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C. The Cost of Silence
Further argument against a robust right to silence focuses on the
204
false negatives it would produce in order to prevent false positives.
Larry Laudan, for example, claims that victims of crime bear some of
the costs of mitigating wrongful convictions (type I errors). In his
view, lowering the false acquittal rate (thereby reducing type II
205
errors) is equally if not more desirable. According to Laudan and
Lillquist’s recent challenge to protections around silence, “[w]hile it is
plausible that the frequency of false convictions would fall in the
transition from weak to strong silence regimes, it is even more likely
that the same transition will bring in its wake a larger rise in the
206
frequency of false acquittals.” False acquittals, however, are an
unquantifiable construct. Despite the fact that type II errors must
occur, one cannot say with any confidence how many, or for what
reason.
Logically, protecting silence will incentivize some guilty
defendants to withhold information. But the cost in terms of lost
convictions is theoretical. There is no population of “known guilties”
207
who are wrongly acquitted comparable to the growing dataset
208
containing “known innocents.” The requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt makes attribution of acquittal to any particular
209
source, like a suppressed confession, speculative. Nor are there any
204. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 618 n.2 (6th ed. 2003)
(assuming a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors as a result of exclusionary rules); ALEX
STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 172 (2005) (“The legal system can . . . reduce the
incidence of wrongful acquittals (‘false negatives’) by increasing the number of wrongful
convictions (‘false positives’), and vice versa.”).
205. LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL
EPISTEMOLOGY 130 (2008).
206. Laudan & Lillquist, supra note 184, at 49; see also, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry
Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 65, 84 (2008) (“Likewise, many of the
remedies for reducing the number of false convictions increase the risk of false acquittals, and
with it, the risk of rising crime vindication.”).
207. But see Alex Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
PROC., at iii, xvi (2015) (noting that wrongful convictions “often result in another injustice or
series of injustices” because along with the conviction of an innocent man “a guilty man is left
free and emboldened to victimize others”).
208. See Exoneration Detail List, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx [http://perma.cc/T3C9-QJPV] (documenting
1635 exonerations as of August 2015).
209. Cf. Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 188
(2008) (stating that there is “strong evidence that coercive techniques increase the odds of a
false confession . . . but we do not know by how much . . . [and] [i]t is possible, for all we know,
that the overwhelming majority of coerced confessions are true”).
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base rates of innocent and guilty suspects in police interrogations
210
against which false confessions can be measured.
Nonetheless, debate about the costs and benefits of the Miranda
211
rule often coalesces around the lost information it may cause. The
specter of unstated confessions looms large because they are widely
212
regarded as high value evidence, even sometimes referred to as the
213
“queen of proof.” The Supreme Court has at times reflected this
idea that confessions are “essential to society’s compelling interest in
214
finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law,” and
215
has declared that they are “like no other evidence.” But the Court
has also stated that “a system of criminal law enforcement which
comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less
reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on
extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful
216
investigation.”
Confessions are treacherous not only because they are subject to
217
abuses but also because they are convincing. Many people assume

210. Rassin & Israëls, supra note 147, at 221; cf. Commonwealth v. Hoose, 5 N.E.3d 843,
861–62 (Mass. 2014) (upholding the exclusion of testimony about factors present in 150–200
documented cases of false confessions because the expert could cite no studies comparing the
prevalence of those factors among false confessions to their incidence in confessions as a
whole).
211. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 860 (1996) (“[A] total of
18.6% of the suspects in our sample who were given Miranda rights invoked them before police
succeeded in obtaining incriminating information.”). On the empirical debate, see generally
Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387
(1996), and Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996).
212. See, e.g., People v. House, 566 N.E.2d 259, 282 (Ill. 1990) (“[A] system which relies not
at all upon the confession will, in many instances where extrinsic evidence is lacking or
inconclusive, be incapable of protecting society from perhaps the most cunning criminal
elements which threaten it.”).
213. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 14 (1978)
(“The maxim of the medieval Glossators, no longer applicable to European law, now aptly
describes American law: confessio est regina probationum, confession is the queen of proof.”).
214. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).
215. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (“[T]he defendant’s own confession is
probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.”
(quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (White, J. dissenting))).
216. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488–89 (1964); see also Allen & Mace, supra note
188, at 264 (“There are strong policy reasons for not wanting to rely on evidence from someone
who has an incentive to hide the truth.”).
217. See Seidman, supra note 129, at 164 (explaining that confessions mislead because they
“present the illusion of escape when there is no escape: confessions are always just another
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that confessions, given their incriminating nature, must be true.
Police, prosecutors, judges, and jurors all want to believe them
because they offer unique access to the defendant’s own thoughts.
218
They seem self-authenticating, have false precision, contain potent
219
prejudice, and potentially bias the perceptions and decision-making
220
of criminal justice officials and fact-finders alike. Indeed, the
presence of a false confession can delay or derail an exoneration even
221
after DNA testing conclusively establishes factual innocence.
Confessions have a persuasive force so enduring that they can
222
They simply override
actually outweigh scientific evidence.
powerful contradictory information like forensics because they
further narrow the official tunnel vision that can keep the criminal
223
justice system from self-correcting when error occurs.
Even if it were the case that criminal justice reforms should be
neutral with regard to the direction of the error corrected—that
224
wrongful acquittals are as bad as wrongful convictions —there is no
mask”); cf. Peter Brooks, Speech, Silence, the Body, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN
LAW, supra note 33, 190, 211 (commenting that custodial interrogations are so “crude” and
“weighted” that we may not “wish [suspects] to speak freely”).
218. See Leo et al., supra note 150, at 485 (“Confessions are among the most powerful forms
of evidence introduced in a court of law, even when they are contradicted by other case
evidence and contain significant errors.”).
219. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that
“[n]o other class of evidence is so profoundly prejudicial”).
220. See Leo et al., supra note 150, at 520 n.273 (“Researchers have demonstrated that mock
jurors find confession evidence more incriminating than any other type of evidence.”).
221. See, e.g., Andrew Martin, The Prosecution’s Case Against DNA, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/magazine/dna-evidence-lake-county.html
[http://perma.cc/L3JX-QQAA] (discussing the case of Juan Rivera, who signed a false
confession that was instrumental to his conviction at three successive trials, including one that
occurred after DNA evidence excluded him as the perpetrator).
222. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 404–08 (discussing exoneration cases in which
contaminated confessions trumped the DNA evidence pointing to innocence).
223. See Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOL. 431, 441
(2012) (“[F]alse confessions, once taken, arouse a strong inference of guilt, thereby unleashing a
chain of confirmation biases that make the consequences difficult to overcome despite
innocence.”); see also Erica Goode, When DNA Evidence Suggests “Innocent,” Some
Prosecutors Cling to “Maybe,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
11/16/us/dna-evidence-of-innocence-rejected-by-some-prosecutors.html [http://perma.cc/CLP45WJP]; Jon B. Gould, Julia Carrano, Richard A. Leo & Katie Hail-Jares, Innocent Defendants:
Divergent Case Outcomes and What They Teach Us, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 78 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014).
224. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 216 (1990)
(“[T]he only way to reduce the probability of convicting the innocent is to reduce the
probability of convicting the guilty as well.”); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1408 (1991) (“[A] guilt-innocence
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empirical basis to conclude that silence fails to enhance net accuracy.
Stronger protections could reduce the overall number of statements
suspects make, but it is not clear that the lost statements include a
significant number of accurate confessions. Compliance and
correctness are not the same thing. Generating more incriminating
evidence in the investigative process does not necessarily mean that
police have received more reliable information. Moreover, the
speculative value of missing confessions no longer weighs heavily
against the real data and concrete details about false statements that
225
have contributed to wrongful convictions.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERROGATION REGULATION
If silence indeed communicates the desire to separate from law
enforcement, and the failure to let it speak for itself hazards
inaccuracy, how could courts fashion more silence-sensitive rules
around interrogations? Even as the low costs and considerable gains
of preventing government-created evidence grow clearer, the force of
Miranda’s protections has diminished. The Court’s inconsistent
reasoning about waiver and invocation might be reconciled through
new insights about silence. Reconsidering the connection between
due process exclusion and reliability could also improve the courts’
mechanisms for screening out government-created evidence. The
most promising applications, however, may be changes to law
enforcement practices on the ground. Reliability concerns have
recently contributed to widespread recording of interrogations. That
increased transparency could in turn encourage other reforms,
including limiting the length of time silent suspects can be
interrogated, and clarifying the notice they receive.

neutral approach to error-allocation has the effect of removing error-allocation as a concern
separate from error-avoidance.” (emphasis omitted)); Larry Laudan, Is It Finally Time to Put
“Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” Out to Pasture 17–18 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series Ser. No. 194, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID18153
21_code515373.pdf?abstractid=1815321&mirid=1 [http://perma.cc/2PSW-59Z4] (arguing that
recommendations for additional protections to prevent false convictions “fail to acknowledge
the very serious costs associated with false acquittals”).
225. See False Confessions, Understand the Causes, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php
[http://perma.cc/T7KE-9XD9]
(“[M]ore than 1 out of 4 people wrongfully convicted but later exonerated . . . made a false
confession or incriminating statement.”); % Exonerations by Contributing Factor, NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonera
tionsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx [http://perma.cc/8S4B-4YDL] (attributing 13 percent of
exonerations to date to false confessions).
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A. Space for Silence
First, correcting the asymmetry between silent waiver and
express invocation would form more protective space around silence,
give the decision to stay silent some procedural consequence, and
make it more likely that a suspect will maintain silence and avoid
226
introducing inaccuracies. To do so would also give effect to the
Miranda Court’s statements that the right to remain silent can be
invoked “in any manner,” and that there is a “heavy burden” for the
227
government to establish waiver.
The practical realities of
interrogations bear little resemblance to the balance the Miranda
Court envisioned. Fully 80 percent of suspects who receive Miranda
228
warnings waive their rights, and almost none assert or reassert them
229
once questioning has begun. Moreover, when reviewing cases of
disputed waiver and disputed invocation, courts construe ambiguity in
favor of admitting suspects’ statements. Indeed, some datasets
indicate that courts are ten times as likely to find waiver as to
230
conclude that the suspect retained Fifth Amendment protections.
Police should, however, be as willing to recognize indirect
assertions of silence as they are to proceed after implicit waivers. Or
at least they should ask clarifying questions about ambiguous
231
requests. Whereas the willingness to submit to questioning is
assumed from almost any response a suspect gives law enforcement—
including no response at all—invoking the right to have silence and

226. Compare Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (invocation of the right to
counsel must be “unambiguous”), with North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)
(waiver need not be formal and can be inferred “from the actions and words of the person
interrogated”).
227. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475–476 (1966).
228. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 211, at 859 (reporting that the waiver rate is 83.7
percent); see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report
Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 383 (2007). Most of those
suspects have experience of the criminal justice system. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286–87 (1996). On the rate of, and
reasons for, waiver, see also supra text accompanying notes 130–34.
229. E.g., Stuntz, supra note 37, at 977 (“[O]nce suspects agree to talk to the police, they
almost never call a halt to questioning or invoke their right to have the assistance of counsel.”).
230. See, e.g., George C. Thomas, III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1972–
73 (2004).
231. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE
LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 61 (2005) (describing how police procedures such as
clarifying questions could solve evidence-related issues when suspects make ambiguous waiver
requests).
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cut off questioning requires a hyperliteral assertion. But invocation
is more request than offer, and one that many suspects will make
233
indirectly.
Some groups of suspects, including women and
minorities, may be even more likely to speak in a pattern that falls
234
short of a clear assertion. Although savvy suspects may use the
requisite words and take the necessary tone, vulnerable and
inexperienced ones rarely succeed in maintaining sufficient space for
235
silence.
Of course, nothing formally prevents a suspect from simply
staying quiet, no matter how insistent the questioning. But revealing
the incidence of false confessions has also demonstrated that the right
to be silent often requires the corresponding protection of having
silence. At the very least, a close look at the elements of false
confessions suggests that invocation and waiver should be self236
executing to the same extent.
Recasting the function of silence as space for reflection and a
protection against undue inference seems to support a more
pragmatic approach to recognizing invocation. It is important to
acknowledge, however, that any expanded interpretation of
Miranda’s requirements seems unlikely. According to Richard Leo,
“the Miranda ritual makes almost no practical difference in American
police interrogation” because almost all suspects waive their rights,
and with respect to the rest, police “have developed multiple
strategies to avoid, circumvent, nullify, and sometimes violate
Miranda and its invocation rules in their pursuit of confession
237
evidence.” Moreover, there is an argument that Miranda makes
matters worse for suspects by insulating subsequent coercive

232. See Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, Cops & Robbers: Selective Literalism in
American Criminal Law, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 229, 256 (2004) (explaining that many judges
require a suspect to explicitly invoke his or her right to cut-off questioning).
233. Cf. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) (“We recognize that requiring a
clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear,
intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will not clearly articulate
their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present.”).
234. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 315–19 (1993).
235. Stuntz, supra note 37, at 977.
236. See, e.g., Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Toward a Unified Theory of Testimonial
Evidence Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1135, 1190 (2007).
237. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 124 (2008); see
also Stuntz, supra note 37, at 976 (noting that the effects of Miranda have been “small, perhaps
vanishingly so”).
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238

techniques from scrutiny. The doctrine now serves “mostly as a
239
weapon to negate claims of coercion.”
Nor would it be realistic to expect any doctrinal fortification of
Miranda. In forty-one of the forty-eight Supreme Court terms since
Miranda was decided, the Court has considered at least one case
interpreting its requirements. Those decisions have significantly
contracted and only rarely expanded its reach. For example, physical
evidence obtained as a result of Miranda violations is not subject to
240
suppression, statements taken after infringing on Miranda can still
241
be introduced for impeachment, the definitions of custody and
interrogation have constricted the circumstances under which the
242
right applies, and the public safety exception has limited its scope as
243
well.
According to Barry Friedman, the Court has actually
244
overruled Miranda by “stealth.” Charles Weisselberg, who wrote in
the late 1990s about paths to “saving” the decision, resigned himself a
245
decade later to pronouncing it dead and “mourning” it.
238. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 29 (2010) (“Miranda has been gutted as a legal matter, and
as a factual matter its impact might very well be perverse.”); see also BROOKS, supra note 33, at
11 (“A cynical interpretation of the Court’s decision in Miranda would say that the Court cut
the Gordian knot of the problem of voluntariness by saying to the police: if you follow these
forms, we’ll allow that the confession you obtained was voluntary.”); SEIDMAN, supra note 32,
at 102 (“Physical violence is still out of bounds, but the courts today regularly permit the kind of
police threats, fabrication, and manipulation that might well have led to suppression of
statements in the pre-Miranda era—so long, that is, as Miranda’s warning and waiving ritual is
duly observed.”).
239. SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 139; see also id. (“For all practical purposes, the
voluntariness of the waiver seems to legitimize the questionable interrogative methods that
follow in its wake and to absolve the interrogator of any responsibility for inducing the suspect
to falsely incriminate himself.”); Leo et al., supra note 150, at 498 (“[B]y focusing on the proper
reading and waiver of the Miranda warnings, trial judges often appear to avoid the more
difficult task of analyzing whether police pressures have overborne the suspect’s decisionmaking capacity or whether the confession is, in fact, a reliable piece of evidence.”).
240. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633–34 (2004).
241. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
242. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 300–02 (1980).
243. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984).
244. Friedman, supra note 238, at 16. On the extent to which Miranda has been functionally
overruled, see also Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 20
(2004); Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 984
(2012); George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation
Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1092–95 (2003) (book review).
245. Compare Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 177
(1998) (arguing that the “original vision” of Miranda “provides substantial protection to Fifth
Amendment values, fits with our constitutional jurisprudence, provides necessary bright-line
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Furthermore, thousands of pieces of scholarship discussing those
decisions have not substantially altered the restrictive direction of the
246
precedents.
There is no meaningful, durable right to silence in interrogations,
and there does not seem to be any momentum behind creating one
through Miranda jurisprudence. The Miranda warnings “may be the
247
most famous words ever written” by the Supreme Court. Indeed,
they have become so thoroughly engrained that the Court accounted
for their status as “part of our national culture” in declining to
248
overrule Miranda in Dickerson v. United States. But the perception
that warning suspects somehow inhibits law enforcement and
249
precludes confessions is similarly entrenched. Miranda may be not
250
only the best-known criminal law decision, but also the most
251
vigorously critiqued. The opinion is thus all but a dead letter, and it
provides little scaffolding to construct significant protective space
around silence.
B. Implementing Reliability
Accordingly, it might be more realistic to focus on extra-Miranda
interventions that could address the ambiguity of silence, and in doing
so interpose some barriers to interrogation-induced evidence. The

rules for police and trial judges, and maintains public confidence in our courts and police”), with
Weisselberg, supra note 74, at 1521, 1592 (concluding that the Miranda rule does not “afford
many suspects a meaningful way to assert their Fifth Amendment rights” and is “largely dead”
“[a]s a prophylactic device to protect suspects’ privilege”).
246. Cf. Ronald J. Allen, The Gravitational Pull of Miranda’s Blackhole: The Curious Case
of J.D.B. V. North Carolina, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 143, 146 (2013) (noting the “vast and
tedious” literature on Miranda).
247. Leo, supra note 66, at 671.
248. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
249. See Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It,
How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 163 (2007) (stating that
Miranda is “one of the most praised, most maligned—and probably one of the most
misunderstood—Supreme Court cases in American history”); see also Carol S. Steiker, CounterRevolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 2466, 2479 (1996) (“Yet given the vociferous outcry against Miranda, which was clearly
the most notorious (to detractors) of the Warren Court’s criminal decisions, Miranda’s basic
requirements . . . have remained largely, even surprisingly, unaltered.”).
250. See, e.g., Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP.
L. REV. 551, 551 (2007) (“Miranda v. Arizona is probably the most widely recognized court
decision ever rendered.” (footnote omitted)).
251. See, e.g., FRED GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 6–7 (1970) (discussing the
political backlash against Miranda and the decision’s timing in the midst of escalating crime
rates).
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right to silence, to the extent there is one, is enforced as a matter of
252
due process as well. Miranda displaced but did not replace the
totality of the circumstances inquiry to determine whether law
253
enforcement coerced a suspect’s statement. That inquiry may have
sufficient elasticity to incorporate the insights of the new reliability,
and a renewed focus on silence itself might in turn produce a more
workable due process test.
The question of whether police “overbore” a suspect’s will
bedeviled courts in the Due Process Clause cases that predated the
Miranda decision. Identifying the incentives of law enforcement poses
a stubborn problem, and it would be unworkable to simply substitute
an inquiry into the state of mind of the interrogator for an assessment
of the suspect’s experience of coercion. Generally speaking, the Court
has declined to consider the subjective motivations of law
254
enforcement. But focusing on a suspect’s initial silence and then
considering the circumstances surrounding its breach could clarify
255
whether police engaged in an “improper practice.”
Moreover, one way of conceptualizing coercion is to ask whether
suspects have been led to believe that they do not have the option to
stay silent. And the actual words and actions surrounding silence
include objective markers of the subjective experience of having no
choice. Even if it is hard to say, absent physical abuse, whether a
suspect was “forced” to implicate himself, information closer to the
surface about the interrogation—including how long periods of
silence lasted and how suggestive the questions and statements were
in the interim—could expose whether the government applied undue
256
pressure.
252. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
253. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process
and the Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 178–79 (2005).
254. E.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 326 (1994) (per curiam) (“[O]fficers’
subjective and undisclosed suspicions . . . do not bear upon the question whether [a suspect is] in
custody, for purposes of Miranda, during the station house interview.”).
255. See Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957, 957
(1997) (“Courts should define the term coerced confession to mean a confession caused by
offensive governmental conduct, period.”). But see Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to
Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 449–50, 536 (2002) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment
protects only against the admission of compelled statements in court and does not regulate
police conduct).
256. See SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 97 (calling the “voluntariness/compulsion focus”
“misguided” because “the question we should ask is whether police interrogation techniques
invade a protected private sphere by abusing intimacy and illusions of intimacy and, if so,
whether that invasion and abuse are justifiable”); Allen, supra note 179, at 213 (“The only thing
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The empirical findings of the new reliability advocacy and
scholarship, and the connection between failures in the system and
co-authorship by the government, suggest that the due process
analysis ought to reference accuracy concerns. The Supreme Court
has displayed some ambivalence about including reliability
determinations in the calculus of fair procedures. Although some
Justices accept that the goal of ascertaining truth animates due
257
process, the Court has also stated that unreliability “is a matter to
be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum . . . and not by the
258
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Recently, in
259
Perry v. New Hampshire, the Court ruled that the Constitution does
not demand an inquiry into the reliability of eyewitness-identification
260
evidence obtained under unreliable conditions.
Fairness, voluntariness, and reliability overlap, however. While
different values, they often move in the same direction. “Making” a
suspect speak can violate autonomy principles, and the statements
that follow an improper breach of silence also occur in infelicitous
conditions—such as prolonged interrogations or threatening
questions—that diminish the quality and reliability of a confession.
The question is not merely whether law enforcement extracted a
statement improperly, but also whether it created that statement in
261
the process. As Stephen Schulhofer has argued, if “officers were

that can be done is precisely what the voluntariness test tried to do—array the forces brought to
bear on an individual and work out the line separating the acceptable from the unacceptable
inductively.”).
257. See, e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“The State’s obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible, truth
emerges. This is also the ultimate statement of its responsibility to provide a fair trial under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
258. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (citation omitted).
259. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
260. Id. at 730 (“[W]e hold that the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary
judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was
not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.”).
261. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing About Self-Incrimination, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
729, 739–41 (2008) (defining statements taken in violation of the privilege against selfincrimination as the ‘compelled products of compelled cognition’); Allen & Mace, supra note
188, at 267 (“The government may not compel revelation of the incriminating substantive
results of cognition caused by the state.” (emphasis added)); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating
Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351, 400 (2012) (“Evidence created without provocation by the
government is not compelled . . . .”); cf. Robert P. Mosteller, Revealing and Thereby Tempering
the Abuses of Government-Created Evidence in Criminal Trials, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1277
(2010) (citing the “corrupting influence of the government‘s hand in the evidence development
process”).
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told it was permissible (and perhaps therefore their duty) to use all
pressures short of actually breaking the suspect’s will,” then “there
can be little doubt that more abuses would occur, even though the
262
worst abuses would still be theoretically prohibited by other rules.”
Those abuses include co-authoring statements that seem to have the
263
“epistemic authority” of the defendant and thereby also resist
264
market corrections in the adversarial process.
At first glance, considerations of a confession’s reliability appear
to implicate the same unpredictability that references to coercion
265
engender. Although impossible to say with certainty whether a
266
suspect spoke as an act of free will, introducing the concept of sole
267
authorship could help shape a sturdier test. One of the key sources
of wrongful convictions, according to the new reliability literature, is
the set of situations in which suspects or witnesses have little choice
but to say something, and law enforcement participates in what they
268
say.
Indeed, several studies suggest that police-induced false
269
confessions go hand in hand with psychological coercion.
Determining whether there has been government participation will
not capture every situation of coercion, and adding that element

262. Schulhofer, supra note 189, at 326.
263. See Michael S. Pardo, Self-Incrimination and the Epistemology of Testimony, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2008) (defining testimony as “any evidence that requires reliance
by the fact-finder on the epistemic authority of the defendant”).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 217–23 (on the durability of false confessions).
265. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004) (reasoning that a multi-factored
test runs afoul of Miranda’s status as “an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the
police”); Stuntz, supra note 37, at 981 (explaining that the voluntariness standard “could not
separate good police tactics and good confessions from bad ones”); see also Miller v. Fenton,
474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985) (noting that the “hybrid quality of the voluntariness inquiry” includes
“a ‘complex of values’” (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960))).
266. See SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 79 (without the “natural law baselines” that previously
distinguished freedom and coercion, “these distinctions, upon which the Fifth Amendment rests,
become very difficult to maintain”); Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 71, 76 (2006) (criticizing Miranda’s conception of free will as unattainable because all
choices are conditioned by reasons).
267. Cf. Peter Brooks, The Future of Confession, 1 LAW, CULTURE & THE HUMAN. 53, 60
(2005) (“Where psychology brings ambiguity and complexity and layering of motive, the Court
wants certainty and bright lines.”).
268. GARRETT, supra note 16, at 19–20 (discussing characteristics of contaminated
confessions).
269. See, e.g., Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police
Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. &
SOC’Y 189, 191–92 (1997) (listing studies of psychologically induced false confessions).
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270

makes the protection narrower, but it also makes it stronger and
271
more straightforward to apply.
Reevaluating the significance of silence has the potential to move
the debate about the privilege beyond the direction of possible error
and also beyond the question whether the privilege requires
272
protection via rule or standard. Open-textured inquiries into the
existence of ill-defined elements like coercion carry a high risk of
273
error, while rules allow law enforcement to adhere to a clear line,
observing the letter but then violating the spirit of the Fifth
Amendment in a way that would be prohibited in a more standard274
like regime. Moreover, Miranda’s prophylactic requirement, like
275
many rules, is both under- and over-inclusive. Reliability is a more
dynamic consideration, but its boundaries can be better defined
within the frame of the particular concern about governmentcreation.

270. See Medwed, supra note 164, at 1556 (noting concern about declining attention to
defense arguments based on constitutional violations and procedural unfairness because of the
“overwhelming noise created by the innocence movement”).
271. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 155 (1991)
(concluding that there will be fewer rule-based errors if more factual predicates are added to a
rule). By way of analogy, the Court’s recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence implements
reliability but according to a narrow concern with the potential for government manipulation.
See Lisa Kern Griffin, The Content of Confrontation, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 67
(2011); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
the judgment) (critiquing the majority’s insistence on a bright line rule that “adds little to a
trial’s truth-finding function”). For an illustration of the Court’s continuing dispute about the
relationship between a substantive reliability standard and a procedural rule that turns on
whether a statement is testimonial, compare Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358–59 (2011)
(“In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify
some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”), with Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705,
2715 (2011) (“[T]he comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial report drawn from
machine-produced data does not overcome the [Confrontation Clause’s] bar.”).
272. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1495–96, 1535 (2006) (equating balancing tests with substantive reliability
concerns and bright line rules with procedural guarantees); cf. Frederick Schauer, The Miranda
Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 157–58 (2013) (noting the way in which Miranda imposes a
rule-like construct on the standard of voluntariness by prescribing law enforcement behavior).
273. See, e.g., Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 387 (1985).
274. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REV. 591, 599 (1981).
275. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 271, at 31–34; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58–59 (1992) (“A rule necessarily
captures the background principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of over- or
under-inclusiveness.”).
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Put another way, looking for hallmarks of co-authorship could
add more rule-like characteristics to the reliability calculus. Richard
Leo, for example, has suggested ways to operationalize this concern
with accuracy: courts could determine whether a confession leads to
the discovery of evidence previously unknown to police, whether it
includes identification of highly unusual non-public facts, and
whether it accurately describes mundane details of the crime as
276
well. Courts could also look closely at indicia of a suspect’s intent
and effort to maintain silence, the duration of that silence, and the
information and incentives that law enforcement provided in order to
break it. By doing so, courts could begin to evaluate the interactions
between police and interviewees through objectively observable
277
phenomena beyond the issuance of Miranda warnings.
Ultimately, refocusing courts on police practices at the
intersection of waiver and invocation, or developing a due process
test that combines elements of standards and rules to detect the
danger of co-authorship, would face significant challenges. Miranda’s
protections have been contracting for decades, and the Supreme
Court has often declined to enforce alternative reliability
278
guarantees.
C. Law Enforcement Interventions
Even though the law of interrogations has both narrowed and
hardened in a way that makes reform via the courts unlikely, that
does not prevent police from implementing better practices. On-theground reforms to interrogations offer perhaps the best means to
279
enlarge the space for silence. And law enforcement has responded
276. Richard A. Leo, Peter J. Neufeld, Steven A. Drizin & Andrew E. Taslitz, Promoting
Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to
Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 792 (2013).
277. Richard Leo and others have further argued for pretrial reliability assessments of
confession evidence using the exclusionary potential of Rule 403 as the legal mechanism instead
of the voluntariness prong of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 793; see FED. R. EVID. 403 (giving
trial courts discretion to exclude evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect).
278. See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728–30 (2012) (stating that the
“potential unreliability of a type of evidence does not alone render its introduction at the
defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair”) .
279. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Still Convicting the Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1500 (2012)
(book review) (“[A]djudication can serve only as a ‘backstop’ accompanying direct reform of
the primarily investigative practices that generate error . . . .”); see also Rachel A. Harmon, The
Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 776 (2012) (arguing that judicially imposed
constitutional restraints are inadequate to regulate law enforcement conduct); Schulhofer, supra
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to some of the insights of recent innocentric scholarship and the social
science on compulsion, memory, decisionmaking, and even the tunnel
vision that investigators and prosecutors can experience. Several
jurisdictions, for example, have established conviction integrity units
280
in recent years to review potential wrongful convictions.
Those
reviews have in turn informed investigative and prosecutorial tactics
281
in current cases.
As Dan Simon has explained, interrogations are “the most
overtly adversarial part of the criminal investigation, and thus also the
most inimical to the portrayal of the police’s work as an impartial and
282
objective search for truth.” Indeed, Richard Leo writes that the
“entire interrogation process is carefully staged to hide the fact that
283
police interrogators are the suspect’s adversary.” Leo goes on to
describe the process of police interrogation as “firmly rooted in
284
fraud.” This Article suggests that there is a more subtle way in
which interrogations relate to fraud, and that is in the production of
inaccurate statements that do not originate with the suspect. False
confessions produce compelling evidence but yield no information.
The process of adjusting the adversarial orientation of police at
critical junctures where inaccuracy arises is thus essential, but also
most likely to come from within the executive branch rather than in
response to judicial requirements.

note 65, at 892 (“One can fairly question whether anything the Court might do in this area
would change the underlying social and political realities very much.”); Simon, supra note 153,
at 453 (“Given the benefit of minimizing the incidence of error from the start, the criminal law
debate has much to gain by shifting its attention from the courtroom to the police station, and
by looking beyond constitutional protections and procedural rights toward the adequacy of the
practices by which the evidence is produced.”). But see Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory
for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow,
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2001) (“[S]o long as the vast bulk of police and prosecutorial
power targets the relatively powerless (and when will that ever be otherwise?), criminal
procedure rules that limit public power will come from the courts or they will come from
nowhere.”).
280. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Prosecutors Create Unit to Find Wrongful Convictions,
WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/dc-prosecutorscreate-unit-to-find-wrongful-convictions/2014/09/11/91a3722c-39da-11e4-bdfb-de4104544a37_
story.html [http://perma.cc/9EUJ-GE8W].
281. See generally CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNITS:
VANGUARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (2014), http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/Conviction-Integrity-Units.pdf [http://perma.cc/K8FX-TADA].
282. SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 132.
283. LEO, supra note 237, at 25.
284. Id.
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1. Observing Silence. Perhaps the most frequently advocated
285
reform to interrogations has been to record them. In May 2014, the
Justice Department changed its longstanding policy against recording
and established a presumption that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and the United States
286
Marshals Service will electronically record custodial interviews.
Even before the change in federal policy, many state and local
287
jurisdictions had adopted mandatory recording. One cannot hear
silence, but in many cases it will now be visible. Increasing use of
recorded interrogations permits evaluation of what took place
between police and a suspect while silence was maintained and at the
288
time it was broken.
Ensuring a rich and accurate record of interrogations can both
prevent coercive breaches of silence and expose them to more precise
interpretation. Video evidence can support or refute the
government’s claim that a suspect reacted to a guilt-assuming
question in a telling, albeit nonverbal, way. For instance, Genovevo
Salinas’s interrogation was not recorded, and consequently it is

285. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody
Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1128–30 (2005). Police officers who have actual
experience of using recorded interrogations “enthusiastically support this practice.” Id. at 1128.
286. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to the
Assoc. Att’y Gen, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Policy Concerning Electronic Recording of
Statements (May 12, 2014), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1165406/recording-policy.
pdf [http://perma.cc/PK9M-TPGC]; see also Michael S. Schmidt, In Policy Change, Justice Dept.
to Require Recording of Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2014, at A14 .
287. Compare State v. Barnett, 789 A.2d 629, 632 (N.H. 2001) (“The police need not tape
the administration of a defendant’s Miranda rights or the defendant’s subsequent waiver of
those rights.”), with State v. Scales, 518 N.W. 2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (“[A]ll custodial
interrogation including any information about rights, any waiver of those rights, and all
questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded when
questioning occurs at a place of detention.”). Many police departments voluntarily record
interrogations as well. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors
and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 26 (2010).
288. See Leo et al., supra note 150, at 530 (“Judges can determine whether the critical details
of the crime contained in the confession originated in the mind of the suspect or were suggested
to the suspect by the interrogators, either inadvertently or intentionally, only by seeing or
hearing what happened during the interrogation.”). Similar intuitions about the importance of
seeing an exchange with law enforcement in order to increase accountability have inspired calls
for increased use of police body cameras in the wake of the unrecorded encounter that caused
the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. See, e.g., Require All State, County and
Local Police to Wear a Camera, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 13, 2014), https://petitions.white
house.gov/petition/mike-brown-law-requires-all-state-county-and-local-police-wear-camera
[http://perma.cc/J7UQ-D4VZ].

GRIFFIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

11/25/2015 1:38 AM

SILENCE

747

difficult to say whether he indeed appeared uncomfortable when
asked about the shotgun. As the officer who took his statement
testified at trial, “[I]t’s been a long time ago and there’s a lot of
289
details about this case and many other cases in between that.”
Video footage can also expose the subtle coercion that often leads
vulnerable suspects to confess falsely. The 2011 dismissal of charges
against Nga Truong—who had been imprisoned for three years
awaiting trial for the murder of her infant son—came about only after
a judge viewed the recorded interrogation that provided the sole
evidence against her, an encounter in which she sobbed for two hours
in the face of relentless accusatory questioning, threats, and promises
290
before finally “admitting” to the killing.
Recording also has the advantage of revealing what may be
inadvertent confession contamination. In most of the false
confessions linked to wrongful convictions to date, nonpublic details
that validated the confessions were transmitted to the suspects by law
291
enforcement. Both what the suspect intended by her silence, and
the external noise that intruded on it before she made any statement,
become visible through recording. If recording is automatic rather
than selective, a complete and continuous documentation of the
events and sounds from the moment the suspect enters the
interrogation room, and an account that includes the perspectives of
292
both officer and suspect, then it can be a valuable diagnostic tool for
the problem of government-created evidence. It can show not just the
content of the statement produced but also the context of its
293
production.

289. Joint Appendix at 10, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246).
290. For the video itself and details on the case, see David Boeri, How A Teen’s Coerced
Confession Set Her Free, NPR (Dec. 30, 2011, 3:23 PM), http://www.npr.org /2012/01/02/1444893
60/how-a-teens-coerced-confession-set-her-free [http://perma.cc/P3AV-D8RE].
291. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 120, at 1068–74 (discussing five cases in which law
enforcement either directly or inadvertently supplied non-public details in false confessions).
292. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 173, at 997 n.681 (reporting that only two of the 125 false
confession cases in their study involved interrogations that had been recorded in their entirety);
Kassin et al., supra note 287, at 25 (“[A]ll custodial interviews and interrogations of felony
suspects should be videotaped in their entirety and with a camera angle that focuses equally on
the suspect and interrogator.” (emphasis omitted)); see also G. Daniel Lassiter, Andrew L.
Geers, Ian M. Handley, Paul E. Weiland & Patrick J. Munhall, Videotaped Interrogations and
Confessions: A Simple Change in Camera Perspective Alters Verdicts in Simulated Trials, 87 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 867, 867–69 (2002) (noting that videotaping alone is not a technological fix
for contaminated confessions).
293. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88
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Other recent reform proposals similarly focus on ensuring that a
suspect’s words and law enforcement’s contributions can be
distinguished. Commentators have suggested, for example,
interrogations involving questioners other than the investigating
294
detectives to minimize “false or superimposed narratives,” and
formal application to courts for interviews conducted in the presence
295
of magistrates. Scholars have also drawn attention to potential
structural changes in interrogations—including techniques like
cognitive interviews, conversation management, and reverse-recall
questioning—that are designed to preserve an investigative,
information-seeking stance and prevent the contamination of
296
confessions with nonpublic facts.
2. Timing Silence. What might be the simplest approach to
protecting silence, however, has received comparatively little
attention: limiting the length of interrogations. Reconsidering timing
might ensure that suspects who have silently expressed the desire to
be left alone can achieve separation, and in turn prevent the
placement of words in their mouths. Duration of confessions is one of
the primary risk factors for a false confession, and another is the

J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 494 (1998) (stating that recordings can assist the
determination of voluntariness by revealing when a confession is “internally inconsistent, is
contradicted by some of the case facts, or was elicited by coercive methods or from highly
suggestible individuals”).
294. Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1660; see SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 137
(reporting that “simulated interrogators who were led to believe (fictitiously) that the suspect
was guilty were more inclined to ask guilt-presumptive questions, to exert stronger pressure on
the suspect, and to use a wider variety of techniques to induce a confession, including the
presentation of false evidence and promises of leniency”).
295. Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 898–900 (1995); see also SEIDMAN, supra note 32,
at 116 (“Trading formal, carefully regulated contempt proceedings for largely unregulated,
treacherous, and abusive station house interrogation is not an obvious loss for civil liberties.”);
Alschuler, supra note 59, at 2667–69 (agreeing that magistrate interrogation could be preferable,
but only with unsworn suspects who do not face sanctions for failing to answer); id. at 2669
(noting that a list of endorsements for this “formalized” interrogation idea “reads like an honor
role of the legal profession” (quoting Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 n.5 (1978) (Stevens,
J., dissenting))).
296. See, e.g., SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 140–41 (describing the “PEACE” method
of interrogation currently used in the United Kingdom). “Cognitive Interviews,” a protocol
generally used with cooperative witnesses, are an attempt to develop detailed accounts from the
witness’s own memory untainted by inaccuracies contributed by the interviewer. Id. at 118.
“Conversation Management,” intended for uncooperative interviewees, also requires the
investigator to play a “largely passive and facilitative role,” encourage the suspect to talk, and
collect information from the suspect herself. Id. at 141.
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Better
interrogator’s conviction that the suspect is guilty.
understanding both the fragility and the interactive nature of silence
exposes some of the reasons why. Moreover, a clearer focus on the
passage of time in the interrogation room may be the reform proposal
least likely to interfere with convictions of the guilty and most likely
to reduce the risk of wrongful convictions. A suspect who first speaks
after a prolonged interrogation may develop a desire to cooperate, or
may just be ground down by the questioning technique, and law
enforcement has not demonstrated the consistent ability to sort out
which is which.
“Speech acts” like promises have significance once uttered
298
because they do something as soon as the words are said. Silence
has sufficient content to “do” something as well. The communicative
intent of silence merits interrogators’ attention, and the action of
staying silent in the face of prolonged questioning at some point
should have the same force as the words used to invoke rights.
299
Maintained over time, silence is “very, very powerful” outside of
interrogations, and should do similar work in interactions with law
enforcement. Indeed, time matters a great deal to the meaning of
300
silence.
Brief silence during questioning may amount to a
conversational pause, but extended, effortful silence warrants some
protective space. Staying silent guards against being made to “recall”
something entirely new or state complex facts in a compelling but
misleading narrative. There is more to this protection than the
opportunity to keep quiet; it requires freedom from extended or
persistent questioning as well.

297. See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 137, 140 (listing the interrogator’s “initial belief,” the
“scope and intensity” of interrogation techniques, and the ‘”duration of the interrogation” as
factors increasing the likelihood of obtaining false statements). A recent study concerning the
low threshold that police have for concluding that the suspects they encounter are guilty
addressed the significance of officers’ punitive preferences when it comes to applying a standard
like probable cause. See Richard H. McAdams, Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, The
Law of Police, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 148 (2015). Similarly, in the interrogation room,
questioners’ assumptions about guilty narratives can distort truth-seeking.
298. See generally J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1975) (introducing the
concept of a performative utterance).
299. Kennedy, supra note 18, at C1 (quoting Daniel Moquay’s comment on Yves Klein’s
silent symphony and its demonstration that silence communicates).
300. John Cage, for example, explained that duration was the most fundamental
characteristic of music to him. “Silence,” he wrote, “cannot be heard in terms of pitch or
harmony: It is heard in terms of time length.” KYLE GANN, supra note 14, at 80.
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Suspects endure lengthy interrogations and then suffer wrongful
301
convictions all too often. This can occur either because wholly false
confessions are made, or because partially true but incomplete and
inaccurate statements sidetrack investigators. Even when a suspect
stays silent in the face of questioning, law enforcement can fill the
space with a guilt-presuming narrative, leading questions, and
nonpublic details of the crime. If that approach then yields a false
statement, it will in turn produce a wrongful conviction about 80
302
percent of the time. One study concluded that the median length of
interrogations that contributed to wrongful convictions is twelve
303
hours. The data now available on silent innocents and tainted
confessions provides new support for proposals such as a six-hour
304
upper limit. Certainly, a suspect who remains silent for that length
of time, or even less, has already made the most accurate contribution
to the investigative process he is likely to offer. And in the event that
a suspect later determines he would like to engage with law
enforcement after all, the case law already contains a mechanism for
305
reinitiating contact after time has passed free from questioning.
Suspects could also be advised, after maintaining silence for some
period of time like three hours, that their continued silence will
mandate an end to the encounter.

301. See SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 134 (relating the experience of Byron Halsey,
who was wrongfully convicted and served nineteen years in prison after confessing to killing his
two children because he “just wanted the cops to leave [him] alone” after thirty hours of
interrogation); Garrett, supra note 8, at 402 (reporting that twenty-five of the twenty-six DNA
exonerations over the past five years involving false confessions had interrogations that lasted
from three to twenty-seven hours).
302. Leo, supra note 125, at 211.
303. Drizin & Leo, supra note 173, at 948. Seventeen-year-old Terrill Swift, for example,
was interrogated for twelve hours as a suspect in a 1994 Chicago rape and murder. His false
statements were the primary—indeed, the only—evidence supporting his conviction, and he has
explained that several hours into the questioning “terror and exhaustion” prompted him to
repeat what he thought police wanted to hear. He has been exonerated by DNA evidence after
spending seventeen years in jail. See Goode, supra note 223.
304. White, supra note 139, at 145 n.257; see also Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of
Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 37 (2015) (“In
view of the desirability of drawing a line, it seems reasonable to say that confessions elicited
after more than six hours of continuous interrogation should be deemed per se involuntary.”).
The Court’s only upper limit to date comes from a case recognizing a 36-hour interrogation as
coercive. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).
305. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102–03 (1975) (concluding that the assertion of Fifth
Amendment rights does not give rise to “a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any
further questioning”).

GRIFFIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

11/25/2015 1:38 AM

SILENCE

751

3. Silence and Notice. Suspects might also receive more ample
notice of what the law requires if they indeed intend to claim the right
to silence. The standard Miranda warnings could include the
information that interrogation will continue absent an affirmative
306
request to be left alone. The Supreme Court has stated that no
307
particular script is required for the warnings, and thus they could be
modified without judicial action. Law enforcement agencies are free
to craft a colloquy that ensures that suspects understand that they
must verbally communicate their decision to exercise their rights in
308
order to stop the questioning. A corollary warning that choosing
silence will not give rise to negative inferences would also comport
309
with the case law on post-Miranda invocation of the privilege. A
recent study concluded that only 2 percent of police departments
310
offer supplemental warnings along these lines. But reframing silence
as potentially reliability-enhancing could increase that number.
Furthermore, enhanced notice could respond to emerging
concerns about our adversarial system of criminal justice taking an
311
accusatorial turn too far upstream, where investigators should
better distinguish between fact-finding and advocacy. A focus on the
discourse and timing of warnings could put law enforcement agents
themselves on notice of the perils of participating in the production of

306. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 469 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (discussing the role of warnings in ensuring the “right to choose between speech and
silence” (quoting Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987))).
307. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 62 (2010) (concluding that warnings that “reasonably
convey[]” a suspect’s rights satisfy Miranda).
308. See Richard Rogers, Kimberly S. Harrison, Daniel W. Shuman, Kenneth W. Sewell &
Lisa L. Hazelwood, An Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehension and
Coverage, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 177, 178 (2007) (arguing in favor of “allow[ing] individual
jurisdictions to establish their specific wording so long as they convey the general requirements
for warnings”); see also Laurent Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535, 584
(2012) (discussing a proposed additional warning advising suspects that they have the right to
terminate interrogation at any time by expressly invoking their rights).
309. See Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that suspects may
elect to be silent with regard to particular questions during an interrogation without facing
impeachment for that selective silence). On reforming the warnings to convey to suspects that
they will not be penalized for staying silent, see Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda
Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 783–84
(2006).
310. Rogers et al., supra note 308, at 186.
311. Cf. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1704 (2009)
(concluding that contrasting adversarial and inquisitorial processes “has not proven useful in
American criminal procedure . . . because the ‘inquisitorial system’ is so ill-defined” and
elements of both models coexist in the criminal justice system).
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statements. If they adjusted the length and nature of questioning in
the face of silence, they would get less material, but the material they
312
did obtain would be worth more.
The discussion here of potential reforms focuses on those that
protect silence itself, and on reconceptualizing silence as something
that can be beneficial to the criminal justice process. Greater respect
for silence can prevent both coerced statements and false ones, and it
can improve the information conveyed in an interview when a suspect
does choose to speak by creating a boundary around the words that
are her own. Awareness of the nature and function of silence thus
could increase the signals and reduce the noise in interrogations.
CONCLUSION
Accuracy is, or ought to be, the overriding goal of the criminal
justice process, and recent empirical developments demonstrate that
error in interrogations decreases the reliability of outcomes. Renewed
and reframed protections around silence could mitigate those errors.
Interrogation regulation should leave space to observe suspects’
attempts to separate from questioners, and should leverage that
opportunity to avert co-authored confessions. Making space for
silence could shield the context of confessions and guard against
abusive interrogation techniques. Noticing where and how silence is
breached could also improve the content of statements by revealing
instances of government contamination and manipulation.
Theorizing what silence means, accomplishes, and defends
against requires an understanding of its dynamic nature. John Cage’s
work and related meditations on silence call attention to the way in
which the space around silence fills with sound from other sources—
some intentional and some unintentional. Similarly, silence forms a
necessary boundary between a suspect’s own statements and
information that instead stems from government sources in
interrogations. Listening for silence, and scrutinizing the government
speech surrounding silence, could thus be a mechanism for evaluating
a statement’s reliability.
This discussion of the current status and significance of silence
suggests many further avenues of inquiry. It begins, however, to
312. Indeed, preliminary assessments of recent reforms to questioning practices in the
United Kingdom indicate that one can eliminate many risk factors for false confessions without
changing the rate at which confessions in general are obtained. See, e.g., Kassin et al., supra note
287, at 27.
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demonstrate that the link between silence and reliability is closer than
previously thought, and a useful guidepost for future decisions about
how to regard silence in interrogations. That the innocent profit from
silence is no longer in any doubt, and it is time to move the debate
beyond the costs and benefits of silence to better means of
implementing its protections.

